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ABSTRACT 
'lhe purpose of this thesis is to e:xamine the diplomacy of 
the mission of General George Catlett Marshall to China in 1946. 
By utilizing material gleaned chiefly from United States Relations 
with China, with Special Reference to the Period 19h4-1949, the - -- ----------------
Congressional Record, and the ~, a ste~-by-step account 
of the Marshall Mission is attempted. lfloreover, the effort is ma.de 
to see the mission in its proper setting, against the backdrop of 
Oriental Communism and of antique Chinese Confucian authoritarianism. 
Thirdly, the narrative of the mission itself is coupled with news of 
developing public opinion in the United States, China, and the Soviet 
Union, in an endeavor to determine the relationship and impact of the 
public temper on the mission, or~~• In brief, the salient 
purpose is to observe the po1,,1er of the democratic practice of diplomacy 
when it is pitted against the anti-democratic force of ideology. 
One fully positive correlation is -,srj_elded by the study: Marsh-
all followed his directives to the letter. Indeed, his austere, nti.litary 
obedience was so straight and unwavering tba t the biographical chapter 
on him seems to have been included, in the last analysis, as a matter 
of scholarly convention. His directives, moreover, had written into 
them an element which largely pre-empted any 11diplomatic 11 battle in 
China and made it rather one of opposing ideologies. The United States 
was irrevocably tied to support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist 
faction. Stage by stage, this persistent fact inexorably alienated the 
Chinese Communists f:rom the negotiations and made them more amenable to 
support from, and collusion with, the Y~emlin. When t his potentiality 
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was early manifested, Chiang himself became minatory, finally sett-
ling upon a policy o.f force when he had seen that he could obviate 
Ha.rshall 1 s constraints with impunity and still count on an J\merican 
sentiment that ,;-ms growing more and more monomaniacally anti-Commun-
- ist in temper. The result was that Chiang went the way of reaction, 
suppression, and cruelty, and the Chinese population, in the words o.f 
Dean G. Acheson, "moved out from under11 his despotic leadership. 
Chinese Communism soon took over the China mainland, felling National-
ism in violent ~truggle which took place as i.f there had been no diplo-
ma.tic intervention by the United States. 
The determining factor seems to have been in an American for-
eign policy, which, from 1946 through 1949, as Archibald MacLeish notes, 
was a 11mirror :una.ge 11 of Soviet foreign policy. It 1-ias a -policy based 
on anti-Communist ideology, and one which t hereby passed over many of 
the political social, military, and economic exigencies of post-war 
China.--exi.gencies which needed to have been taken into consideration 
if diplomacy was to be given a chance to function. 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the diplomacy of 
the Marshall Mission against t he historical backgrounds of inter-
national Communism and of antique Chinese Confucian authoritarian-
ism. Moreover, the effort has been made to co-ordinate material 
gathered from govern.i11ent documents with that gleaned f r om issues of 
order that any possible correlation between 
the events of the :Marshall Mission and the t emper of public opinion 
in the United States, as well as :in Russia and China, can be gauged 
in some rough::..fashion. The solution of the problem of exact relat-
ionships, however, have been left t o matching Ha.rshall Is perfonnance 
in diplomacy with the stipulations of his directives--an academic 
operation which so nearly yields full posit i ve correl ation that, in 
many respects, the biographical chapter on 1:Jarshall, seeming to assume 
t he potential exercise of a per onal impact, may ·well have been includ-
ed as a mat ter of scholarly convention in the final anal ysis . 
On November 27, 1945, General George Catlett Marshall was 
appoi nted as President Harry s. Trurna.11 rs special envoy to China. 
His instructions charged him to work toward p eace in the civil war 
in China, and toward the inauguration of stable government. Also, these 
operations were to be undertaken on t he assumption that national leader-
ship in China would continue to be wielded by China's 11 best asset for 
democracy, 11 Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . If the pol icies 
of the Chinese Communists were not already predetermined by t he inter-
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national pretensions which Chinese leaders like ~.ao Tse-tung had been 
voicing since 1920, and by t heir will ingness to pay deference to the 
Kremlin l ine and to be used by t he Soviets for Russ:La.n purposes, the 
.American policy of unwavering support for Chiang and the Kuomintang 
soon gave promise itself of detem ining those policies. 
narsh.all succeeded in the "nearly impossible, 11 effecting 
a cease-fire on January 13, 1946. But the agreement seems in retro-
spect t o have been signed purely for propaganda purposes. This was 
perhaps particularly true of the Communists, since the Political 
Consultative Conference, uhich vJa.s in session from January 14, 1946, 
to January 31, projected plans for the new government which posited 
the power of leadership in Chiang Kai-shek and. gave the Kuom:inta.ng 
superior positions in the State Council and in the constitutional 
assembly. 
The second step in Narshall 1 s diplomacy, t hat of negot i ating 
an agreement on military demobilization and r eorganization, was t he 
crucial one. The idea was to end civi--1 strife permanent ly so that 
l asting political acc ord could be achieved. Both Nationalist and 
Communist forces were to be reduced and integrated into a new nation-
al 11nonpolitical 11 army. The improbability of complete neutrality and 
the fatuousness of the hope to reduce poltically-spirited armies into 
a unified and relatively docile policing force were sho1m by t.he very 
provisions of the agreement itself, which was pronmlgated on February 
25, 1946. The Nationalists were to be given a five-to-one superiority 
in the integrated forces of every region; and in Manchuria, an area to 
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which the Communist armies curr ently had much better access t han did 
the Nationalists, the Kuomintang armies uere to enjoy a fourteen-to-
one superiority. General Chou En-lai, the Communists' field general: 
and chief negotiator, consequently refused t o comply with the agreement. 
From this point on, the breach continually widened. Sporadic skirmishes 
in north China. between the t wo armies i ncreased in scope and f r equency. 
Communist propaganda, emanating from Mescow as well as Yenan, soon 
began to complain of the presence of .American troops in Clrlna and of 
the fact that American aid had favored one faction only. Then, seem-
ingly in riposte, . Connnun:i..st a.nnies entered into Manchuria during the 
month of April when the Russians were eva.cua t:L-,g. There they were arm-
ed and supplied with surrendered Japanese ·weapons and material; and 
the Nationalists found themselves unable to exercis e the sovereignty 
they had been granted in Manchuria by the Yalta Agreement and the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of August, 1945. Chances for reconciliation diminished 
aJ.Jnost t o nothing. In June, Chiang announced his determination to 
wrest Changchun f rom the Communists, and ~Iarshall, fully committed to 
full support of both internal peace an:l Chiang Kai-shek, could only 
request self-restraint from the Generalissimo. Comnnmist faith in 
American mediation, an element which might have permitted the American 
mediator to use the Communist faction as insurai1ce against Nat ionalist 
excesses, was now destroyed. 
Nationalist armies soon besieged and occupied t he i'-Tanchurian city 
of Changchun, and Chiang 1 s forces flared out toward Kirin and Harbin. 
Chiang, meanwhile, professed peaceful intent to Marshall, but sinru.ltan-
eously reduced the American mediator to the f unction of carrj-"ing his 
demands--only occasionally mitigated by American emendation and 
paraphrasing--to the peace table. 
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In July, John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching Univ-
ersity at the time, ·was appointed at Marshall's behest t o be the 
United States Ambassador to China . American raediation thereupon 
seemed too supin@ to be fil'fective. The joint statement of Marshall 
and Stuart, issued on August 10, 1946, cited the economic deterior-
ation of China and the continued warfare in t he face of the popular 
desire for peace and prosperity. Tru.rnan s:LTl!Ultaneously testified to 
the impotence of his negotiators by addressing his comnru.nique of .Aug-
ust 10 not to 'Marshall or Stuart, but rather directly to Chiang, warn-
ing the Generalissimo that his present minatory behavior could only 
delay the extension of American economic aid to China, since such 
extension would continue to await the cessation of hostilities in 
China and the inauguration of stab e government. 
Chiang, however, continued his march into Ha.nchuria and north 
China, and by October 10, the strategic city of Kalgan had fallen into 
Nationalist hands. This was the actual coup de grace of mediation. 
The American team now stepped aside as a Third Party Group made an 
abortive attempt at mediation in November. The National istf, however, 
demurred from the conference of November 4 on the grounds that the 
Comm.tmists had refused American mediation. Chiang then unilaterally 
convoked the constitutional assembly on November 12 and drafted a const-
itution which called for all the forms of democracy but largely vit iated 
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their substance by granting extraordinary powers to the person 
of Chiang Kai-shek and to the Nationalist members of the governing . 
liod.ies. Marshall made several overtures to the Communists in order 
to try to persuade them to accept the new· Constitution, but the 
Connnunists were final and adamant in refusal. 
Marshall s personal diplomacy was characterized by unwaver-
ing and literal obedience to State Department directives which 
dictated a narrow 11nonpolitical 11 and 11neutral11 path for .American 
mediation. He was unable therefore to use the Communist faction as· 
a threat against Nationalist excesses--or ~--or to use Amer-
ican troops stationed in China as a possible persuading force when 
an impasse 1-ras reached at the conference table. Strategic redeploy-
ment of American troops consistent with diplomacy and as suited A.-rner-
ican purposes was completel y neglected. Instead, the presence of 
American troops 1-ras utilized by t he Communists for propaganda material. 
In the final analysis, the Marshall Hission, in most particulars, reflect-
ed the ideological temper of world poll tics fallowing World War II and 
the disruption of the Grand Alliance. When the emphasis is on i deology, 
pragmatism is reserved only to cajole the national populations i nto 
agreement on national aims. No compromises were allowed in China. 
And the Chinese found the Chiang government ineffectual, with the result 
that they sought refuge and succor in the Comnmnist movement. 
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PREFACE 
'lhe year 1946 may yet prove ~o have been the most crucial 
single year in modern world history. In December of that yea:r, 
the failure of the mission of General George Catlett Marshall to 
mediate dii'ferencos bet1reen the Chinese Nationalists and the Chin-
ese Conmunists not only sign.if'ied a failure of democracy in one 
large region of the world, but it also immediately preceded an era 
in which pluralism in worldwide political philosophy was to give 
way to a simple bifurcation. The current Sino-Soviet split, the 
heightened truculence of Communist China toward the United States, 
and the present prospect of nu.clear weapons for the Chinese People's 
Republic are all recent developments which make the Marshall Mission 
loom ever more importantly as an area for historical study. 1-arsh-
all was sent to China_ §S ··the ba.rbinger--or perhaps even the prophet--
of the Western democratic spirit. Yet, the entire story of the V.iar-
shall Mission is almost devoid of any- element of democracy. It is 
rather a tale of uncompromising, militant Conmunism encountering 
an opposing force which increasingly found its raison ~• ~tre in 
anti-Communist intransigence rather than in the tenets of liberal 
democracy. 
vJha t was clearly evinced in 19 46--even if an infinity of 
causal relations were left unlmown--was that~ unremitting, world-
wide totalitarian movement undoubtedly had the capacity to pressure 
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democracy to the breaking point. The question of the survival 
of the democra tie ideal--a question which seemingly has vexed man 
for centuries--became now the most paramount of questions. Did 
democracy, in order to maintain itself in the face of a dynamic 
foe, have to adopt author:Jl:tari.an methods to such an e:>..."tent that 
democracy itself -was nega tad from within? Or was there a modus 
qperand:i whereby democracy could continue to oppose both the Right 
and the Left, arrogating the enemy's methods to itself only super-
ficially and on isolated and crucial occasion? Or thirdly, could 
democracy possibly survive through the simple application of its 
essence, and fight the good fight in a way that would be peculiarly 
and exclusively democratic? These were the questions which 1946 
brought to Western man with redoubled impact. 
While it would be the sheerest mad pretension to submit that 
t r.is work answers questions so broad and sweeping as these, it has 
nevertheless been its purpose to examine the diplomacy of the Marshall 
Mission against the historical backgrounds of international Conmnmism 
and antique Chinese Confu.cia.n authori tarianism--and to examine it, more-
over, in relation to the ever-ossifying points of view which were be-
coming predominant in the two quarters which were steadily becoming 
anode and cathode of world opinion--Washington and Moscow, the United 
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The method of the 
paper is to try to measure in some rough -r,ray the power of the democratic 
practices of diplomacy as against that of the antidemocratic forces of 
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ideology, and to make conclusions which purport to arry exact.itude 
only ~Jith relation to the problem immediately at hand.. Inferences 
and implications which may lead to broader conclusions, either 
correctly or erroneously, we elect to leave as scholarly heurist ics 
that beg for no attention if t hey cannot contnand. it. 
Research on Oriental Communism and on the Marsh.all Mi ssion 
i t self was largely limited to the Deparunent of state' s publicati on, 
United States Relations~~~ Special Reference~~ 
Period 19Lh-1949, to the Congressional Record, to the series on 
Foreign Relations .2.f United States, and 
Admi. ttedly, there are notable gaps. Perhaps the pr:une deficit in 
this area is t he lack of a scholarly biography of Marshall, a work 
which gives no pronti.se of ever being written. Moreover, i t might be 
mentioned that even the documents pertinent to this study, bordering 
as t hey do on questions of political ideology and belief , Illllst be 
~eel and utilized w:i th careful critical process. 
Acknowledgement is made to the members of my t hesis comrni ttee, 
Professors Eugene R. Craine, Wilda M. Smith, Raymond L. Welty, and 
Roberta c. Stout, who have been longsu.ffering but reasonably cheer ful 
through all the inconveniences to which they have been subjected.; to 
Bu.gene Mullen of the Library staff , w'no bore with equaninrl ty the extra-
ordina:t'IJ liberties that were taken with library- materials; and to 
all nw £riands, whose predictions that the work would never be f j.nished 
time atd again sparked a renewed effort. 
CHA.PTER I 
PURPOSE OF THE MARSHALL MISSION AND DEFDUTION 
OF THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM WHICH IT POSES 
The purpose of the Marshall Mission, as stated by President 
Harry s. Truman in his directive to General George Catlett Marshall 
on December 15, 1945, was: 
• •• to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national 
conference of representatives of the major political elements 
to bring about the unification of China, and, concurrently, 
to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North 
China.1 
General Marsh.all's task, in other words, 1-ras to bring about a 
cessation of hostilities in the ciVil conflict that 1-ro.s currently 
raging in China between the armies of the Chinese CamntUnists and 
those of the Chinese Nationalists, and to initiate a more stable 
and democratic government in 1mich both factions irould have a voice, 
but of 1-m.ich Chiang Kai-shek, Gene1',llssimo of the Nationalist Arrey' 
and President of the National Government, would be at least the nom-
inal head.2 According to the historian John King Fairbank, the final 
1As quoted in John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China; The 
VJ.emoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missiona~ and rns'sacior'(New York: 
Random House,1:954), 315.. Hereinafter ci ed. as Stuart, Fifty • 
2 Harry s. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 
1956), II, 68.. The statement on 11United States Policy Toward China, 11 
issued along with Marshall's directive on December 15, 1945, is quoted 
as saying that Chiang's Nationalist Government 11is the proper instrument 
to achieve the objective of a unified China. 11 Here:l.nai'ter cited as 
Truman, Memoirs. 
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settlement which was envisaged was a coalition government in which 
the Communists would assume a suboro:i.na te position ald.n to the pos-
ition which Canmrunist parties held in the ·coalition governments of' 
Western Europe) Thus, the disasters which cunently threatened 
China--econom:ic and political anarchy on the one hand, and complete 
Carrnunist takeover on the other--were t o be averted through the inter-
position of American diplomacy. 
If the Presidential letter of December 15, 1945, however, is 
used as the criterion of failure or success of the Narshall Mission, 
its diplomacy was most clearly a failure. As Herbert Feis writes, 
11 The years have forced us to realize how grave and hard was the mission 
on 'Which Marshall set off; how bleak the outcome, how ominous the 
sequence. 11 4 Bad portents on the eve of Marshall's departure for China 
indeed had no answer. Marshall returned to the United States at 
Presidential behest on January 6, 191..i.7.5 The Chinese civil war had 
resumed in a more vigorous fashion than ever, and both sides had 
given up any pretense at the compromise which might have eventuated in 
the penna.nent coalition government which the United States had desired. 
3John King Fairbank, 'lhe United States and China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1~), 266. Hereinaftercited as Fairbank, 
JI· ,2• ~-
½ierbert Feis, The 
1
China. Tanl7le; 'lhe American Effort in China 
from Pearl Harbor to the Birs'iiaii ffi.ssioo(Princeton: Princeton Univ-
ersity Press, 19531, ~. Hereinafter cited as Feis, Tangle. 
5congressional Record, 80 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: United 
States Govenunent Printing Office, 1947), xct, Part l, 367. Her.Mnafter 
cited as Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 ~• 
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Moreover, by the time Marshall had returned. to the United States, 
the dire f'a te of' the Chinese Nationalists seems to have been some-
·what hermetically sealed. Sino-Russian Communist collusion, the 
loose ends of' which finally nogged the prospects for lasting peace 
to death during Marshall's tour of' duty, began at this time to go to 
work on Chinese Nationalism. From Manchuria, where the Chinese 
agrarian armies (as they were called by· such deluded people as the 
Foreign Service officers then on duty in China) bad repaired almost 
!:! to be armed with surrendered Japanese weapons by the evacuating 
Russians,6 the Corranunists began their drives which swept the Nationalists 
off the ma.inland and eventually culminated in the complete Communist 
control w'nich 1'Jas achieved on October l, 1949. 7 The illusion under 
which Marshall had labored--namely, that either Chinese Communist or 
Nationalist factions would be amenable to the lasting truce which 
would make possible peni1anent peace and coali tion--seemed to ha.ve been 
quite fully dispelled by the time the Communists bad achieved this 
control. Indeed, by the time o.f the early 'fifties, when the Chinese 
Canmmnists sent troops to aid the puppet regime o.f North Korea in 
repelling United Nations forces in the Korean Conflict, the dynamic 
internationality of the Chinese Communist movement ha.d become so clear 
that the Marshall Mission began to many observers to appear as more 
of a stupid bl1.mder than a naive mistake on t he part of American Far 
6Hu, Chang-tu, China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture 
(New York: Hraf Pres~60)-;-'13-34• 
7congressiona.l Record, 81 Conf, 1 Sess. (Washington: United 
States Government Pr:i.iiting Office, 949),--XCV, Part 10, 13741. 
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Eastern policymakers. During the first session of the Eighty-Second 
Congress, for instance, Senators Styles Bridges, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, 
William F. Knowland, and Owen Brewster held hearings on Far Ea.stem 
policy wherein it was openly alleged, in the senatorial conclusions, 
tha. t Marshall' s six-months embargo on arms to the Nationalists during 
his mission had contributed crucially and substantially to the Communist 
triumph. It was by this time recognized that the Chinese Co:rmnunist 
revolution was no less than 11 extremely dynamic" in nature; and the 
hearings called for a departure from the policies of Secretaries of 
State James F. Byrnes and Dean G. Acheson, which, acco1uing to these 
findings, were nothing short of 11appeasement11 of the international. 
Communist conspiracy.a Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the red-baiter 
from Wisconsin, went a step further at about this same ti.me and labell-
ed General Marshall as a 11 t raitor to his country11 who had a knowing 
hand in the conspiracy principally by virtue of resisting Chiang K:l.i-
shek' s effort to unify China by the force of Kuomintang m:i.li tary might.9 
'Iha val:i.di ty of the extreme to 1tmich McCarthy went can most 
assuredly be doubted. Yet, it is certainly true that the Marshall 
}Iission labored in obviation of certain ideological realities that 
were e:xistent in China, and that its unsuccessful conclusion manifested 
a certa.:in ignorance on the part of A.meri.can policymakers of the tone 
SCri.ticism of American Far Ea.stern Policy, Senate Hearings, 82 
Congress, 1 Session (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1950), 3604, 133-135. 
9Joseph R. McCarthy, General George C. Marshall (Madison: Printed 
by Friends of Senator McCar-l~hy Committee, I948), 53. 
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of political philosophies which had long been in vogue in China. 
One has only to read the literal and philosophical works of M:to 
Tse-tung, for instance, current Chairman of the Chinese People's 
Republic who was in charge of political affairs at Yenan at the 
time of the Marshall lli.ssion, to note clearly a dedicated and undying 
ani.'ll.Osi ty towaro the type of parliamentary government which Marshall 
was seeking to institute in China. As early as June of 1920, Mao 
had sta. ted. : 
I recognize the existence of only two •nations,• the 
•nation• of the capitalists and the 1nation 1 of the work-
ers. At present, the •nation' of the workers exists only 
in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we have the •nation• 
of the capitalists.10 
Further, as if to reinforce this earlier statement, Mao had gone 
on to note at the death of Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, late Premier 
of the Soviet Union, that 11fussia reroains the theoretical fountain-
head of Communism and the mod.el for China now as in the past • • • 
Sino-Russian friendship is unbreakable. 11ll 
Most of the belief that the Chinese Communists were not 
lOAs quoted in Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 2~ 
llAs quoted in Claude A. Buss, !he Far Ea.st (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1955), 546. Hereinafter cited as Buss, Far EE.st. 
Things have changed with the premiership of Nikita Sergeyevich miiiish-
chev, but Chinese leaders still assert their loyalty to Stalinist 
principles, and Mao has recently opined that the only mistake Stalin 
made was that he didn't ld..11 Khrushchev. See 11A Gathering of Murmners, 11 
Newsweek (December 17, 1962), 30-33. 
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really Communists bad sprung from what now appears to have been 
a half-comical episode during the Ambassadorship of General Patrick 
Hurley in China, just prior to the Marshall Mission. As Henry Wei 
records it: 
Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, and 
General Patrick Hurley had a conversation with Soviet Foreign 
Ml.rti.ster V. M. Molotov., wherein the Soviet diplomat told 
them that the Chinese Communists were in no 1vay related to 
Communism, that t hey were in no way tied to the Soviet Govern-
ment, and t hat they were only reformers interested in improving 
the economic conditions of Chi.na..12 
Documents comprising the series, United States Relations ~, 
however, reveal that in the conversation in question, Molotov care-
fully but shrewdly disavowed. specifically only those "Chinese revol-
utionar,1 groups led by Chang Hsueh-liang and Wang Ching-wei which 
included many Conmmists and i'1lrl.ch looked to the Soviet Union for 
sympathy and aid •• •" This might well mean that the Chang and -fang 
factions were to Moscow the opportunists they bad long since been to 
the main body of the Chinese Communists. Molotov then went on to refer 
to the impoverished peoples in some parts of China, 11 Some of whom 
call themselves Comnru.nists but were related to Conmmnism in no 1_;,ay 
at all. 11 But never in this conversation does Molotov declare all 
Gommu.nist factions anathema to the Kremlin, and it seems in fact 
that he here refers to every section of China except t he all-import-
12Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, 1956), 1157"°7iereinafter cited as Wei, Russia. 
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ant factions of }1a.o Tse-tung and Chiang Ka.i-shek.13 
When Hurley had his interview with Marshal Stalin, however, 
on April 15, l9h.5, he presented this eager analysis of the Molotov 
conversation: 
••• that the Chinese Communists are not in fact Commun-
ists at all. Their objective is to obtain what they look 
upon a.s necessary and just reformations in China. The Sov-
iet Union does not desire internal dissension or civil war 
in China. The Government of the Soviet Union ~ts closer 
and more harmonious relations in China •••• l4 
Hurley concludes with the terse sentence, 11Molotov agreed to this 
anacysis. 11 But in the conversations, according to Hurley, crune 
a concomitant expression on the part of the Soviets of intense 
interest 11 in what is happening in Sinkiang and other places and 
·will :insist that the Chinese Government will prevent discrim:i.nation 
against Soviet Nationals. 11151n view of this and the international 
project ions of Russian Communi --which included "closer and more 
harmonious relations in China"--it would have been a diplomatic~ 
_E for Molotov t,o have done anything other than agree to Hurley's 
fatuous anaJ.ysis. Neither Stalin, nor Molotov, nor Mao, in r eality, 
at that time separated national from interna.tional affairs in such 
JJU. s. Department of State, United States Relations with~, 
w.tth Special Reference to the Period 19W-i-l949 (Washington:U. s. 
Government Printing Office ;-1950), 71-=rz: Hereinafter cited as Dept• 
of State, Relations~~• 
J.4rbid., 94-95. 
15Ibid., 95 • 
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a facile manner. The links are clearly seen in fuo 1 s statement 
on international aid: 
'Victory is also possible without international aid 1--this 
is an erroneous thought • • • • If the Soviet Union did not 
•etist, if there were no victory of the anti-fascist Second 
World War and no defeat of Japanese imperialism • • • Could 16 we have won victory under such circumstances? Obviously not. 
As Feis was later to write of the devious statement by Molotov: 
nHurley1s whole later treatment of the internal division in China was 
affected by hearing these words. 1117 Similarly, General Albert Coady 
Wedemeyer, then in charge of the China Theater of Operations, wrote: 
Hurley, in 1944-45 ••• approached the problem of unifying 
China on the false supposition that the Chinese Communists 
were not real Communists under Moscow's command but simply 
a Chinese faction that could be induced by diplomatic nego-
tiations to come to terms with the Nationalist Government.18 
At a much later date, however, President Truman was to deny 
that the Marshall Mission ws undertaken upon such faulty premises. 
"Neither Marshall nor I,n he writes in his Memoirs, "was ever taken 
in by the talk about the Chinese Gorm:nunists being just 'agrarian 
reformers. 111 Yet, he continues that it was not tm.til !ff.arch of 1946, 
16china. Handbook, 195.5-1956 (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1956), 
546, entrrr'ed n 0n PeoplelsDemocra tic Die ta tor ship. 11 
17 Feis, Tangle, 181. 
18Albert c. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Retorts (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1958), 307. Hereinafter ci ed. as Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer 
Reports. 
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when }l'.lrshall, then in the midst of his mission, confided to 
the President that: 
Chou En-lai ~ he Communists' military commander and chief 
negotiatoi:J had very frankly declared that, as a Communist 
he believed firmly in the teachings of Marx and Lenin and 
in the eventual victory of the proleta.ria t. Marshall' s 
messages from China show, also, that he fully assumed that 
the Chinese Communists would, in the end, be able to count 
on Russian support.19 
Moreover, in seeming disconsona.nce, it was in line 1-ri. th the Tru-
ma.n-f ormula ted-and-directed 11United States Policy Toward China" 
statement of December, 1945, which stated that 11It is thus in the 
most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations 
that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their 
internal differences promptly by means of reaceful negotiations, 1120 
that the Marshall Mission found its official basis. The improbabil-
ity and near-illogicalness is every1m.ere reflected in the post-mortems. 
John Leighton Stuart, who served part of his Ambassadorship in China 
during the Marshall Mission, concluded at the end of his service that, 
11In retrospect, with -what we lmow of Communist intentions and methods, 
it seems clear that it ~ he Marshall Missie~ had no chance.1121 
Marshall himself, in his final report of January 7, 194 7, cited the 
19Truman, Hemoirs, II, 90-91. 
20Ib.d -2:.,.•, II, 68. 
2lstuart, Fifty~, 180. 
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mutual suspicion in China that ·Has based on Communist intransigence;22 
and Senator William F. Knowland, speaking on the floor of the Sen-
ate on October 3, 1949, two days after the fall of Chinese National-
ism, spoke openly an:l clearly of Communist international aid to the 
Chinese insurgents.23 If the conspiratorial policy of the Soviet 
Union had hither-to been adumbrated by the earlier Stalinist policy 
of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and maintain:ing scrupulous relations 
with the Republic of China, it now became fully apparent to all as 
the Chinese Ambassador, in October of 1949, raised the cry of "Sov-
iet Imperialismn before the General Assembly of t he United Nations.24 
The abysmal ignorance which resulted in the loss of China to 
the free world has penetrated even into historical literature, and 
has therein set in motion a movement which dwells upon the unfamil-
iarity of Chinese social patterns to Occidentals. Many recent writers 
on Chinese history, while expressly denying the concept of historical 
inevitability, nonetheless point to a simultaneous groping and rigid 
authoritarianism in Chinese development which has wrought certain 
ends which, it is contended, might easily have been foreseen. Fair-
bank, for instance, notes that American policy toward China since 
the entry into the Orient with the Treaty of Wanghsia in 1844 has 
22 6 Congressional Record, 80 Cong., l Sess., 79. -- -
23congressional Recoro., 81 ~-, l ~•, 13741. 
2½.Jei, Russia, 263-267. 
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been based upon a belief in the "exoticism11 of the Orient, plus 
an illusory idealism, "punctuated by a recurrent mood of cynical 
disillusionment, 11 and th.at Chinese history, consequent~, has 
proceeded in its own merry direction in spite of over a century of 
economic subservience and military and poLi.tical inferiority to the 
West.25 Such mysticism, in reality, seems only to underl:ine a mis-
understanding by the West of their own basic political and diplomat-
ic techniques as they were put to use by other powers in the Orient. 
Emblematic of the effect is that, even as Ambassador Stuart was writ-
ing th.at the Coromu.n:ist ideologies were alien to basic Chinese social 
patterns,26John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, and John Carter 
Vincent were noting with perspicacity that the Chinese Communists had 
wide popular support.27 Simultaneously came the other point of Chinese 
Communist power: the long-range policy of the Soviet Union favored 
25Fairbank, ~• ~• ~, 248. 
26 
Stuart, Fifty ~, 4. 
27Not only the 11p:iJlks 11 realized this. So did such respectable 
citizens as Kenneth s. Latourette and Fairbank. Dean G. Acheson, in 
his statement of January 12, 19.50, said: "What has happened in my 
judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of t he Chinese 
people in their misery ended," and that the Communists mount ed on a 
revolutionary spirit which "moved out from under11 Chiang. Foreign 
Relat,ions of the United States, Diploma tic ~;)rs: China (Washington : 
United StatesGovenunent Printing Office, 1 , 112-113. Hereinafter 
cited as F. R. 
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them.28 Solidification of the Soviet position in Sinkiang, 
Manchuria, Mongolia, in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and even in 
Korea, made it only the short-range policy of the Soviet Union to 
cooperate with the nationalist aims of the Chinese revolution, for 
early Soviet gains were recorded in time with the internal machin-
ations of the Communists endemic to China. 29 The pattern of the 
policy itseli', once revealed in its silllplest forms, should in no 
wise have been new to the West. As pointed out by Joseph R. Leven-
son in an article entitled !1Western Powers and Chinese Revolutions: 
. . 30 
the Pattern of Intervention, 11 the West has al·ways r ealized that the 
government of China, whatever the nuance of its political belief, 
always acquiesced more felicitously when it was under the pressure 
of what amoi.mted to a lvestern-inspired rebellion. Consequently, China 
had to qualify .£or foreign aid from powers vfao seemed to be applying 
less pressure than the revolutionists. This method of dealing with 
China vTcLs, moreover, instigated in the heyday of nationalis t ideal-
ism while the T'ai p'ing revolt flickered strong in China. The 
28Lenin, like Mao, thought tha t the Chinese Revolution should 
pattern itself after the Russian 11agrariann Revolution of 1905. 
29 Intimacy always has a great effect. "Sun Yat-sen ••• urged 
his followers to guard the friendship between the two revolutions. 11 
Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, A Political Biography (New York: Vantage 
Press, 1960), 399. -
JOAs reprinted in William A. Williams (ed.), The Sha.pin~ of~-
Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company;-19.56), 6 2::-{)27 • 
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British at this time realized that they could "by a relatively 
small expenditure in the form of suppression of Chinese independ-
ence • • • work their will in China. 1131 The system rests on a 
balance in imbalance, v.r.i.th two threats or destruction to the 
precarious medium: 
•• • either the goverrnnent eventually tries to dispense 
with the West and to right itsel.f ~• ~·, the Boxer move-
ment, 1900, or it threatens to lose its balance completely 
and require more Western succor, lest it fall, than its 
services seem to its Western sponsors to wa.ITant.32 
The United States, however, in 1941, "seemed to lack what Brita.in 
had held in leverage against Chiang Kai-shek in 1927--the priceless 
option to withhold the aid with which he could break the left. 1133 
Thus Chiang could count on American support without caring for the 
corruption in his own government. Thus, neither the government nor 
its opposition remained docile enough to maintain the precarious 
balance of the imbalance in power. Chiang went the way of suppression 
arrl cruelty, arousing a hatred which exceeded that prescribed for the 
11 sort of tame loyal opposition 11 and "steady but moderate resistance 
to the regime which the powers can easily and perpetually eY.ploit. 1134 
Consequently, the "rebels became the government, 11 and "the Kuomintang, 






makes inevitable the Chinese payment of a~ pro .9.::2--political 
submission, if nothing else--no longer to the West, but to Russia. 1135 
The growth of Chinese power within the Soviet bloc has 
recently put an end to such political subntl.ssion. But in the Stal-
inist era, and particularly in the period, 1941-1949, Soviet diplo-
macy, for comparatively small expenditures of aid, and sometimes 
none at all, worked its will in China politically, at least as well 
and at least as effectively as did Western diplomacy. The Russians 
merely :unproved in practice upon the Western powers by cr eating an 
opposition that had to be by political belief both ta.me and loyal, 
supplying the essence of 11 steady but moderate 11 resistance to the 
regime. 
Before and throughout t he period in which the Marshall Miss-
ion is set, the Soviet Union was forging deep into the illlstern Orient 
w.i.th a furtive i.-nperialism \nilch recorded a series of amazingly quiet 
successes. Repeatedly, in accordance with the prescription later 
set down on paper by Levenson, Ho scow had capitalized upon internal 
dissensions fomented by endemic Communist factions to get control 
of the national government itself. In Mongolia, Russia had ta.ken 
advantage of the slow mull in PekLng and among the Chinese National-
ists over the Karakhan Declarations and of incipient Communist act-
ivity in Shanghai, Hmi.a.n, and Paris, where Chou En-lai spearheaded 
t he movement, to push the Mongol People's Party into power in Novem-
ber of 1921. Then, in 1921.i, even as they were promising to evacuate 
Mongolia, Iru.ssia capitalized on the mild opposition and confus-
ion being created by the Chinese Communists and 11Christian11 ·war-
lord General Feng Yu-hsiang to erect the Mongolian People's Re-
public.36 Russian troops met their obligation to evacuate under 
the Koo-Kara.khan Treaty of 1924 only after Outer Mongolia had 
been "cut off from the rest of the world except at the pleasure of 
the Soviet Government. 1137 
.All this was seemingly accomplished, as the belated cry of 
Soviet imperialism would indicate, 'Without the Chinese Nationalists 
becoming cognizant of the effective, two-pronged conspiracy. Dr. 
T. F. Tsiang, for instance, Director of the Department of Political 
Affairs in the ~cutive Yuan, communicated to John Carter Vincent, 
United States Foreign Service Officer, in 1942 that: 
China's historical attitude t oward Outer Mongolia had 
been mistaken. The Mongolians were in no sense Chinese 
and there was no valid rea5§n for denying them~-government (italics mine) • 
Tsiang and the Nationalists, it seems, made the same e:i:Tor in judg-
ment that many observors later made, that is, in assuming that t he 
Russians intended to be allies of nationalism forever . 
In Sinkiang, similarly, Moscow had capitalized upon the height-
36wei, Russia, 120-125. 
31Buss, ~, 301. 
38 !• ~-, 239. 
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ened Chinese Communist "resolve to fight 1139rollowing the White 
Terror of 1927 to force a catering to the Soviets on the part 
of Chinese Governor Sheng Shih-tsai with the result that, "Sin-
ldang, an integral part of Kuomintang China, became a Soviet 
colony in all but name. 1140 
In Korea, the Im.riles, and Sakhalin, Soviet imperialism 
had been intially forestalled because of the strict controls, 
economic and administrative, wielded by the resolute Japanese. 
Still, it was in large part because of the weakness and exhaustion 
of China, largely owing to the negative character of the Communist 
ei'fort in the United Front after 1939, that Russia, in gr.Lm final-
ity, °v'Ja.S to lay hold of Korea. China, by the time the Three Power 
conferences rolled around, was too weak to be considered by the 
Western powers as their foremost Asiatic ally against the Japanese. 
Instead, Russia, having grmm stronger in the Ea.st as a result of 
sapping t he strength from China both externally and internally, was 
hailed into the anti-Japanese alliance at the price of North Korea, 
as well as the later ameJC1tion of the Ku.riles and northern Sakhalin.41 
Manchuria, the return of which to Chinese Nationalist sovereignty 
39Robert Payne, Mao Tse-~, Ruler of Red China (New York: H. 
Wolff Company, 1950),~.- ----
4~s, !:! ~, 308. Wei, Russia, 155 ff. 
Ulr.-1ei, Russia, 172. See also Activities of~~ 
Eastern Commission, Report by the Secretary General, Feb. 26, 1946--
July 10, 1947 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 
35-36:- -
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was a focal point in detennining the failure or success of the 
¥.1a.rshall }li~sion, epitomizes the progress of Soviet imperialism. 
in the E.ast. .After an early history of contending with both China 
and Japan for possessi on of the Chinese Ea.stern Railvay, all post-
dating the promise in the Kara.khan Declarations to return it to 
China, Russia took advantage of China's wealmess after the fall of 
M:lnchuri.a to sell the rail·way in 1935, over Chinese protests, to 
t he puppet state of Manchukuo .42 However, as growing Communist 
strength and increasing Nationalist weakness before the Japanese 
invader forced the United Front after the Sian Incident cf 1936, 
Russia made a nonaggression pact ·with Nationalist China. Mao Tse-
tung, moreover, made the switch with Moscow; and true to the long-
term, two-fold strategy, simultaneously with his announcement of 
allegiance to 11 our dear comrades of the Kuomintang, 11 he embarked 
upon a policy which admittedly included, 11 seventy per cent seli'-
development, twenty per cent compr omise, and ten per cent fighting 
the Japanese."43 'When Japan began to put the heat on Outer Mongolia, 
however, Russia disclosed her "ultimate selfishness in Stalin' s re-
gard for either Nationalist or Corll!TIUDist China, 11 concluding on April 
13, 1941, a neutrality pact with the Japanese.44 But -thus, by 11 giv-
42vJei, ~~Russia, 110 ff. 
~ss, ~, 324. Wei, Russia, 97. 
~tfei, Russia, 13 7. 
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ing up 11 Manchuria, the ·way was paved for the eventual 11 redempt-
ion11 of Manchuria. Over the prostrate fonn 0£ a surrendered Japan 
and the bogey of a ,var-exhausted China, Russian forces were free 
to scramble into Manchuria at the end of World War II and to fore-
stall takeover by a lethargic Chiang. Hurley and Chiang, in this 
conteA--t, worked frantically for a rapprochement between the diss-
ident Chinese factions; and Marshall succeeded in effecting a 
temporary cease fire in January of 1946; but by April, Chinese 
Communist forces were in Manchuria and girding themselves for the 
drives which eventuated in their control of all China. Subsequently, 
even after July 7, 1947, when the Marshall Missi on had repaired 
home and any pretense of Ifu.onti.nta.ng-Gomrrn.mist unity was again dropped 
with all-out civil ·war, the Soviet Union declared as late as New 
Year's Day of 1948 that they "recognized only one government of China., 11 
the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.45 These prot-
estations of loyalty, so filled with profitable vistas to a China 
starved of concrete economic assistance--its extension had been 
predicated upon the success of the Marshall 11ission--or even the true 
sympathy of the Western Powers, forestalled both active opposition 
to the international policies of the Comintern and Cominform, or even 




China mainland had been achieved.. 
As a result of this pernicious1y effective essay in the 
Ea.st, the }Ja.rsba.11 Mission had to face a movement from the left 
in China ,vhich -was eA-tremely rigidif:ied, and which manifested its 
strengths in various areas of economic and political importance. 
In its favor, it coulld list: a) the economic impoverishment and 
discontent of the Chinese populace, a factor with which American 
policy refused to deal until the M:l.rshall Mission should be succ-
essfully completed., b) the long range plans of the Soviet Union 
which were creating the inevitabilities which they bad 11 foreseen" 
46 
in the Orient, and c) a propensity for rebellion, now amalgamated. 
to high pitch by a civil conflict that had already achieved its 
impetus and engendered smoldering enmities. In the face of this, 
Marshall, on his arrival in China, seemed to have a lone asset: 
t he often-cited 11 overwhelrrti.ng des ·re 11 of the Chinese people for 
46western theorists on the question of historical inevitability 
have long polemicized against t11e concept, ignoring the fact that, in 
the Communist world, rigid political philosophies purge unbelievers 
from any exercise of personal volition in public affairs 1"lhich effect 
human history. In competing with the Comnru.nists, also, anti-Communist 
nations have gone far in the direction of absolute policy, thus intro-
ducing the same phenomenon into their own affairs. For a good opposite 
view, see Isaiah Berl:in, Historical Inevitabiliti (London: Oxfortl Univ-
ersity Press, 1954), 6: "In describing human be1a.vior it has always 
been artificial and over-austere to omit questions of t he character, 
purposes, and motives of individuals. 11 
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peace. There was also the rather abstruse concept of popular 
sovereignty which was supposedly somewhere imbedded within the 
tradition of Chinese Confucian philosophy, but the question 
remams as to whether this seeming asset was merely 11fool Is gold. 11 
The Chinese, from scholar to peasant, had always been an amazingly 
comprehending people, and it seems unlikely in retrospect that 
they would ha.ve accepted peace simply ;eer ~, especially in view 
of the violent polarities which were beginning to predominate. 
Further, it is worth going into the historical culture of China, 
if only sciolistically, to note whether the democratic tradition 
in China might have been a real asset to Marshall, or whether it 
was more amenable to the type of goveITII11ental forms which the 
Communists on the one hand and the Nationalists on the ot her were 
aiming at. The important question to bear in mind du.ring such an 
examination is i.fuether the Unit ed States made the err or, as Howard 
F. Cline states often happens in American diplomacy, of attributing 
the same democratic instincts to other peoples as .Americans have 
ingrained into them by education and tradition.47 If so, did this 
mistake force Marshall into t he 'Whirling vortex of the extremist 
eschatology 'Which opposed the Communist salient, yet veiled itself 
wi t h watchwords which were more amenable to Western parliamentary 
denocra.cy? 
47cline cites ethnic and tradit ional differences with regard 
to demo era tic impulses as being the detennining factor in Woodrow 
Wilson I s failure in dealing ,nth the Mexican crisis of 1914-1915 • 
Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1953), iiio. -
CHAPTER II 
CHINESE ANTIQUE HISTORY AND CULTURE AS IT BEARS UPOH THE 
VIABILITY OF THE CHINESE TO WEST E!?U POLITICAL DEl10CRACY 
Isaiah Berlin, in his 1954 lecture at Oxford University 
on historical inevitability, notes that for philosophers who have 
spent their fonnative and educational years in authoritarian cul-
tures, human unifonnity and conform:i.ty quite completely overshadow 
any other historical factor. 11 Thus nations or civilizations," he 
writes: 
for Fichte or Hegel and Spengler; (and one is inclined, 
though somewhat hesitantly, to add Professor Arnold Toynbee), 
are certainly not merely convenient collective terms for 
individuals possessing certain characteristics in common, 
but are more 'real' and more 'concrete' -than the individuals 
who compose them.l 
China in 1946 and 1949 may well have been proof that, on societies 
not specifically based upon individualism, as ours purportedly i s, 
Fichte, Hegel, and Spengler have made accurate connnenta.ries. The 
mistake of 11moral imperialists 11 in behalf of Christianity and 
democr{lcy has eternally been in their underestimating this factor. 
Thus, Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State at the time 
the Marshall Mission was reviewed, begins his narrative of that 
mission by citing the one part of t he Chinese temper in late 1945 
and 1946 which seemed salient to Western observors--a nearly-unan-
1Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford 
Urti.versity Press, 1954), 8. 
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imous desire for peace and for stable government. 2 Yet what 
they ultimately got--and seemingly through their own efforts--
was a prolongation and steady intensification of the civil war 
for some three years, and a stable goverrunent which, in the grim 
finale, was of a quite different character than that which the 
United States bad envisioned. 
The United States initially went to work with a mind to 
the political fragmentation which had occurred in China during the 
nationalist movements, and predicated their efforts for stable 
goverrunent on the assumption that the Chinese people looked at 
democracy as synonymous with peace. But even as educated Westerners 
as Professor Frank J. Goodnow, early in the t wentieth century, and 
scholars of more recent vintage such as John Y,j_ng Fairbank and 
Kenneth s. Latourette have hammered away at the theme that democracy 
cai, never work in China. latourette, for instance, in his Develop-
2£ China, proclaims in one breath that 11No other existing nation 
can look back over as long a past of continuous development as can 
China, 11 and in the next records that the democrat ic temper has been 
excluded from the Chinese political development.3 
Moreover, Fairbank, in The United States~~, e:xpounds, 
2u. S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, 
with Special Reference Peri~::'i9!19 (Washington :'united" 
States Government Printing Office,-19~ "121": 
3Kenneth s. Latourette, Development of China (Boston: Houghton 
:Mifflin Company, 1946), ix~ For a similartreat.ment see also Dirk Bod.de, 
China.' s Cultural Tradition, What and Whither? (New York: Rinehart, Company, 
1957), 3 ff. - -
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almost in spite of himself, the thesis that China I s historical 
humanism is Confucian totalitarianism to the very heart, inveter-
ately opposed to even that degree of libertaria.ni..sm which we 
consider absolutely necessary for the existence of parliamentary 
goverrunent. Fairbank sees a hope for possible ad11erence to West-
ern democratic reforms 11within limits 11 in the traditional duty of 
the Confucian scholar to speak out against "misgovernment; 114 but 
it is also to be remembered that the kind of 11misgovernment 11 which 
was an abhorrence to the Confucian scholar, steeped as he was in 
the ideals of a pyramidal society, vra.s that minimum of control ~mich 
we have abm.ys considered an optimum. 
Fairbank goes on to note that we could not have saved China 
from Communism 11·w:i. thout an utterly different approach prior to 1944; 
not at all thereafter;"5 but no diplomatic or political variable 
peculiar to 1944, save that the Communist movement was gaining strength 
and the right wing of the Kuomintang was fast proceeding toward react-
ion and decadence, is cited. Somewhat anomalously, then, Fairbank 
goes on to castigate the propensity of historians to interpret this 
as the outcome of 11 social trends and forces 11 as the ldnd of int,erpol-
ation which is annoyous to men of action 11 who are conscious of the 
4John King Fairbank, The United States~~ (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1~), 256. 
5rbid., 263 • 
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random elements of chance and personality on history. 11 Yet, 
even -while he records foe achievements of the Marshall Mission 
as "breath-taking11 and a "personal tribute to General Ma.rshan, 116 
he _asserts that t he mission had no chance of success, coming as 
it did after 1944. 
The ma.in problem, as Fairbank sees it, was in getting the 
party dictatorship of the Kuomintang to "pursue democratic refonns 11 
and an equal animadversion on the part of the Communists against 
entering into t he constitutional c oalition.7 Thus, both major 
factions in the China of 1944 are committed to singleminded and 
some'Wh.at authoritarian policies, throl-Jbacks to the days of ·warlord 
culture as it usurped w:i. th despotism the more gentle brand imposed 
by the scholar hierarchy of old. Both totali tar:i.an philosophies, 
in addition, were seemingly exclusive of the other in their philo-
sophical inceptions. 
Latourette, in a second publication entitled~ American 
Record in the Far East, 1945-1951, puts forth mu.ch the same thesis. ------- ---
Basic to 11 the frustration of the United states, 11 he says of the fail-
ure in China, 11wa.s the fact that China was not ready for the ld.nd of 
6Ibid. , 266. 
7Ibid., 267. Harold Robert Isaacs, The Traged~ of the Chinese 
Revolution(Sta.nford: Stan.ford University Tress, ~9 lT, ffl ff., 
expounds upon the antidemocratic intentions of the Chinese Communists. 
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democracy which .Americans knew, and in which they believed. 11 8 
About the Marshall Mission in particular, Latourette sets forth 
an equally pessimistic view: 
Some observers believed from the vecy outset that General 
Marshall had an impossible assignment, and that his mission 
was foredoomed. Certainly the odds were heavily against him. 
The distrust of the Kuomintang arrl the Carmnunists for each 
other was so great, the personal enmities between the leader-
ship so marked, and the basic political and economic theor-
ies so far apart that continuing peaceful cooperation in one 
government vro.s highly unlikely.9 
Thirdly, Latourette alludes to the impossibility of the United 
States 'Winning support for democracy by backing the faction they did. 
"A major reason for the Nationalist de.feat," he writes: 
was that the Ifuomintang, the national government run by it 
and Chiang Ka.i-shek had completely lost the confidence of 
the people. Rightly or wrongly, public opinion held the 
Nationalists responsible for the disasters which had over-
taken China. In the days of the Confucian empire a dynasty 
was said to have •lost the ma.mate of Heaven• when it had 
proved incapable of avert· a series of disasters, whether 
w.an-made or natural. It then collapsed before the blows of 
another aspirant for the throne; and t he latter, if success-
ful, was regarded as having received the mandate of Heaven 
until his house, in tum, proved to be chronically incompet-
ent. Although it was now nearly .forty years since the empire 
had gone, something of the same attitude survived. The pop-
ular mind, without perhaps using these precise words, rega1oo. 
the Nationalists as having forfeited the mandate of Heaven. O 
8:La.tourette, The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951 
(Wew York: The Macmillan Company, l952T, Bo.ttereuiaf'terc'l:tea as 




Latourette fourthly sees the 11weakening of Confucianism," 
but not into any political philosophy which includes democracy as 
more than a transitional stage in the progress toward either economic 
democracy or the oligarchy of rightist reaction. Confucianism, 
according to Latourette, we~kens into Communism on the one hand and 
Christianity on the other, both of which in the twentieth century 
begin to expound the differences which make the one iITeconcilable 
with the other. This, in fact, begins to resemble the Christianity 
of Chiang Kai-shek11and the right Kuomintang on the one hand and the 
COilU11Ul'lism. of Chou m-lai and Mao Tse-tung on the other.12 
It is admittedly with some seeming implacability that Chinese 
history has been rich in aristocracy and autarch'y. The age of the 
Chou rulers, 1122-256 B. c., in which most of Chinese culture gropes 
backt-ard. to its roots, was not only the age of waring feud.al lords 
giving rise to the professions of soldiery and statesna.nship, but it 
was also, quite significantly, the 11 golden age of Chinese philosophy. 1113 
It was hardnosed Confucianism in this age of strife and imperious rule 
1-mich found most popular currency and the most incorporation into 
social institutions. Taoism and Mencianism remained. for the most part 
11see Chiang, Kai-shek, Before Final Victory, ~eeches Ma.de~ 
Generalissimo , Chiang~-~, 1943-2944 (New York: Chinese News 
Service, 1945/~ 
12 Ibid. -
13c1aude A. Buss, The Far F..ast (New York: '!he Macmillan Company, 
1955), 26. tlereinaftercitecias:Buss, ~• 
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the philosophies subservient to the substratwn which Gonfucia.ri-
ism provided, as did the Buddhism later :imported from Japan. 
Chinese Confucian philosophy was more intellectual than religious, 
and by that fact negated the gnostic individual mysticism which is 
at the basis of individualist democracy.14 This negation of individ-
ualism is further reflected in the Confucian social organization, 
an organization based on obligation rather than right and composed 
of a squirearchy of the educated and learned rather than a stratifi-
cation based on earnings or entails.15 Thus, as Latourette has int-
imated, Chinese history has consisted of a series of rimandates 11--
a series of autarchies. The Ch•in Dynasty, 221-207, abolished the 
old feudal aristocracy, but it initiated a new kind of totalitarian-
ism with a centralized bureaucracy, and undertook a "burning of the 
books" to facilit,ate a singleminded, conventional temper in social, 
cultural, and politica l matters. Even when, under the Han Dyna.sty, 
Wang Hang, 8-23 A. D., instituted China• s first refonn by national-
izing and redistributing the land, monopolizing salt, iron, coinage, 
wines, and mines, and. 1-u!ving the state put a floor under agricultural 
prices by surplus purchase--all the ref orm:ing was done under the iron 
tutelage of a benevolent despot, who, moreover, died an early death, 
most probably at the hands of cont emporaries mo spoke out aga.L-,,st this 
14Francis L. K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese, 1iv0 Ways of Life 
lNew York: H. Schumann Company, l9~ 22 ff. - - - -
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progressive kind of ''misgovernment. n 
The succeeding T 1 ang Dynasty illustrated the ease with 
which Confucian squirearchy is usurped by oligarchy rather than 
by the fragmentation emb;ryonic to democracy. In glamor and 
culture, the T•ang Dynasty exceeded all its European contemporaries; 
but the top-heavy structure of the dynasty only veiled an underlying 
military weakness, an ensuant political discontent and economic 
poverty which was to plague China as long as her government remained 
in the hands of a .few. A second 11New Deal11 was initiated under 
the ensuing Sung Dynasty, but here again, it represented only 11a 
tend.ency of the conservative Chinese to experiment in statecraft 
and economics. 1116 Hence, dissatisfaction gained momentum, and during 
the Yuan or Mongol Dynasty, it found combination and outlet with 
a suppressed abstraction--nationalism. This combination overthrew 
the foreign dynasty in 1368, cooperating 1rl.th a conservatism that 
supplied the leadership, as always, to the authoritarian-minded 
Chinese people. But conservatism, nationalism, and economic depression 
gradually gained momentum throughout the Hing and Manchu dynasties 
and were stimulated particularly by the cooperation with the Powers 
by the latter govemment. A new leadership championed the overthrow 
of the old dynasty in the n3.111e of nationalism in 1912,17and did it 
16Toicl., 28 ff. 
17 Tillman Durnin, China and the World ,Jfow York: Foreign 
Policy- Association, 19~fff.- -
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in the name of China as a means of capitalizing upon the long 
pent-up resentment over the unequal treaties habitually imposed 
by the Powers. An antithesis of imperialism and nationalism caine 
to dominate the mind of an underdeveloped China, in congruence w.i.th 
the three major circumstances vlhich Latourette lists as fonning the 
public mind in the China of the twentieth century: a) a national-
ism incited by over a century of foreign domination, b) an extreme 
defensiveness provoked by a combination of foreign invasion and 
exhausting civil strife, and c), as an ancillary to the other two, 
a burning desire for independence.18 
At this time, the mind and spirit of China becamo viable to 
the type of history writing imich sustained itself throughout World 
,var II and 'Which featured nationalism in the face of Japanese imperial-
ism as the deepest desire of the people. Owen Lattimore•s brief 
history of China is exemplary of t his kind of encomium to Chinese 
nationalism. Lattimore' s reputation as a historical and poll tical 
,mter later went into eclipse when he was accused of being a Commun-
ist; but at the time of his writing this work, at least, he is convinced 
of Chiang Kai-shek•s rectitude in accordance with what he cites as 
Cri.ina' s age-old source of strength--that which 11 r eally did lie in the 
people, not in ind.ividuals. 1119 Lattimore, here taking the posture of 
18r.atourette, American Record, 91-93. 
19ewen and Eleanor Lattimore, The Mald.ng of Modern China, A Short 
History \New York: W. w. Norton andeompany, Inc., 19Lt4), 159.- -
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a thoroughgoing Chinese nationalist {He was Chiang• s political 
advisor at the time of writing), regrets even that incursion of 
foreign power which Chiang Kai-shek inadvertently wrought in 1927 
as a result of his purges. 'Ihe events of March 26, 1927, when 
Chiang broke 'I-ti.th the Communists in the Kuomintang and with Russia, 
put China, according to Lattimore, in the hands of Western Powers 
who 11had the ability to act, 11 yet refused because they were: 
in some instances badly frightened by the idea that the 
defense of their vested interests against the Japanese 
might cost them more than their interests were worth, in 
other instances, by the idea that China might •lapse into 
chaos. , 20 
The label of 11Communist11 for Lattimore is likely attached 
as shakily as it is borne. Nevertheless, it is only a short step 
from championing a long-suppressed nationalism in a conservat ive 
nation to the binding of that nationalism to t he other inevitable 
oi'f-shoot of extreme conservati sm, the economic depression of t he 
lower classes. An example of the kind of Chinese historian who makes 
such a connection is the Maoist, Hu Sheng, who, in his Imperi alism 
Chinese Poli tics, corrects even t hose historians ,mo have seen the 
T1ai p•ing rebellion as the beginning of t he imperialist technique of 
causing "danger from 'Without" to coincide with "trouble from within. n 
These 11bourgeois 11 historians, he asserts, have erred in f ailing to 
understand that 11 the Tai ping tsi~ Uprising was, in its nat ure, a 
20:rbid., 1,52. This, in fact, did happen. China fought Japan 
with "magnetic warfare, 11 exhausted herself, and Russia reaped Sakhalin, 
Korea, a11d the Kuriles for her strength, China having "lapsed into chaos. 11 
Jl 
revolutionary peasant wa.r. 1.21 'llie application of the tenn 11 revol-
utionary11 by Hu Sheng is, of course, mistaken, particularly in the 
Communist sense of the tenn. 1-Jhile it is probably tme that the 
main oody of the T•ai p •ing rebellion signified a need of the people 
that surged forth from antiquity--a need later transJ.ated into 
People's Livelihood by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, into &:onom.ic Democracy 
22 
by Dr. Sun Fo and Mao--the rebellion as a 1-mole cannot be termed 
revolutionary and agrarian in the same sense as even the 11bourgeois, 
nationalist11 rebellion became after 1922. The former lacks the true 
professional revolutionary leadership of the latter, and is more truly 
a revolt than a revolution in the historically materialistic sense 
of the latter term. 
Hu' s ensuing and .focal correction of "bourgeois history, 11 
however, points to a correctness in his train of thought even in spite 
of its embellishment in erroneous minutiae. The Manchu Dynasty, he 
claims, ·was not at all the helpless victi,.11 of imperial ism, but rather 
its cohort and helper. Outside the context of Cormnu.nist ideology, 
however, 11helpless victim" is precisely the tenn for the Manchus; 
2¾ro., Sheng, Imoerialism and Chinese Politics \Peld.ng: Foreign 
Languages Press, 19>5), 25. -
22The Three People; s Principles are usually translated as Nation-
alism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood. Sun Fo, wo is Sun Yat-sen;s 
son, was wont to reiterate the alternate rendering of National Democracy, 
Political Democracy, and l:.:conornic Democracy. 
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often they had no other choice but to £al.low the dictates of the 
Powers. But the veracity of the overall pict ure which Hu is try-
ing to depict is difficult to refute. The oppressed. millions of 
China had long been cognizant of a divorcement of the policies of 
their rulers from their own needs and well ... being, and, most of all, 
from their intense sense of nationalism as it began overtly to 
develop in this century. Thus, Connnunism in the •forties, being 
both politically nationalistic and economically revolutionary, was 
in a position to command Large popular support. 
It is the United States, finally, which is indicted by Hu 
as being the chief imperialist depredator throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century an::l the ensuing twentieth centur.r. 
While this is wrong in a very literal sense, it is with some truth 
that the United. States is chosen as symbolic of the ignoring of 
China's millions by the West. No other nation assumed with such 
inveterate blindness that even the most oppressive and corrupt reg-
imes wer e representative of the Chinese peopl e and o_f Chinese nation-
alism.23 
Consequently, in view of the quintessential essay in the 
history of China--a nat ionalism borne out of a decadent Con..-rucian 
23Paul Myron Linebarger, The _?! Chiang \Boston: 
World Peace Foundation, 1941),0 ff., gives littl e space to the 
analogy between warlord.ism and the militarism of the Kuomintang. 
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totalitarianism and centuries of economic depression and supp-
ression--i tis less surprising now than it would have seemed in 
December of 1945 that Mao Tse-tung should soon be writing, 11What 
Dr. _Sun Tut-sen wanted to do in the forty years he devoted to the 
national revolution but failed to accomplish, the peasants have 
accomplished in a few months; 11 24and that he should extoll those 
same peasants 11i:i..th the lines: ''They accept most willi.Y1gly the 
leadership of the Communist Party. 1125 
In 1946, there was consequently a tactile assumption that 
it was Communist singlemindedness alone which was pre-empting the 
hopes of liberal democracy in China. In obviation of the historical 
background which made China not only susceptible to this kind of 
authoritarianism of the left, but also reinforced other kinds of 
authoritarian movements, Marshall was commissioned to introduce 
democracy by attacuing his diplomacy to one of the Chinese factions--
wl1ich itself could only have been born of t he Chinese tradition. 
The perti.'lent question raised by a study of historical issues is 
whether support of one faction did not contribute to the intensifi-
cation of authoritarianism rather than its hindrance and replacement 
with democracy. 
Yet what the historians who are dedicated to the dialectic 
24Mao, Tse-tung, Selected Works ~New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1954), I, 25. -
25Ibid., 31. 
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of inevitability might do well to remember in the case of post-
war China is that the country of Confucius, dedicated to monolithic 
practices frcm an antiquity which far antedates the Western 
classical period, perhaps finds its political history more subject 
to the worki.ngs of historical inevitability than most other countries, 
and thus, the power of the United. States to act here should have 
entertained few of the :i.ro;pediments of Chinese political paralysis 
at this time. 
But the intercession, in the case of civil embroilment, 
must, at the same time, be vigorous and almost revolutionary in 
deportment in order to be capable of infusing the democratic temper 
into the favored--and the unfavored--factions. If it is in the form 
of merely supplying a mediator, he nms t somehow come close to fitting 
the description ·which Sidney Hook gives of what he calls he hero, 
the ~-ma.ld.ng ~, in history, 11,mose actions a.re the c onsequences 
of outstanding capacities of intelligence, will, and character, rather 
than of accidents of position. n 26 
When dealing with a poll tical situation such as existed in 
China after World War II, and to a lesser but increasing degree in 
his own United States, w'here a sharp division of political thought 
was emerging, the mediator would moreover be wise to divorce himself 
from such a bifurcation, retain personal freedom of action so that 
his character might have impact, and to act upon his oim in ways that 
26uarold c. Martin and Richard M. Ohmann, edd., Inquiry~ 
Expression \New York: Rinehart and Company, 1959), 40. 
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are adjusted to the situation at hand. 27 
In the light of these requisites, it behooves us, before 
going into the actual diplomacy of the Marshall l".d.ssion, to examine 
the quali.fications of the mediator himself to deal with a situation 
l'Jhich involved, as we have concluded from Chapter I, an internation-
al conspiracy on the one-hand and its equally-determined opposite 
on the other, when both groups were reinforced by a propensity 
for authoritarianism in Chinese antique history. 
27m the case that the mediator should prove subservient and 
obedient in character, it is clear that the quality of his mission 
will hinge upon the quality and frequency of his directives, their 
flexibility, and the information which reaches the directive-writers. 
CHAPTER III 
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF TtlE MEDIATOR, 
GENERAL GEORGE CATLh"TT MA.RS.HALL 
This chapter must be prefaced by the admission that 
there is a paucity of materials on the life and cha racter of 
General George C. Marshall. There is no biography of him t hat 
is in general circulation, and, save the biased report of Senator 
McCarthy, no work that is wolly devoted to him as a subject. Yet, 
even the Sllperficial information that is available on Narshall 
makes it very clear that at the close of World War II he was, 
historically speaking, a very anomalous, if not dubious, person-
ality. Walter Trohan calls him the most powerful military figure 
in the world at this tin'e because he was presiding officer over the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Anned Forces, imich in 
turn controlled the greatest f i ghting f orce in the world. Neverthe-
less, Marshall had not been a field general and had spent nearly the 
entire duration of the war in Ha shington in an administrative-- a 
directing and presiding--capacity. F.arlier, following his graduation 
from Virginia Mill tary Institute in 1901, he had served as a Second 
Lieutenant in the Philippines; but, thereafter, during World War I, 
his service was largely restricted to administrative duty on the staff 
of General John J. Pershing in France.1 Although he did this ldnd 
of work with distinction, the fact remains that it was a sedentary 
1wa1 ter Trohan, 11 'lhe Tragedy of George Marshall," American 
Mercury, LXXII \_March, 1951), 267-275. 
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and inactive kind of work--the ld.nd of activity which seems 
more apt to proo.uce a Hamlet than a Macbeth. Harsh.all• s closest 
call to combat duty-was as a Lieutenant Colonel in command of 
the Fifteenth United States Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China, 
from 1924 to 1927. 
1!,'Ven in spite of the performance of administrative duty 
wit h excellence, ¥.arshall Is chances of promotion from Brigadier 
General at the beginning of 1,vorld. War TI were small precisely 
because he had had too little experience in the field. It was 
only after Congress had passed an act which temporarily pennitted 
t,he by-pas sing of seniority lists, and at the intercession of General 
Pershing, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted Marshall 
over thirty-four other field officers to the r ank of General and 
appointed h:i.In. as Chief of Staff for t he Army.2 
After his tour of duty in Washington during the war, Marshall 
planned to retire, and took steps to initiate this plan by going 
with his wife to his country home n ear Leesburg, Virginia.3 There 
is, in fact, some evidence pointing to the oonclusion that Marshall, 
particularly at this time in his life, was a retiring t ype of i ndiv-
idual. His personality is described, by those who knew him, a s mild 
3John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years~ China, The Memoirs _of~ 
Lei~hton Stu.art, Missionary and Ambas'sac!or (New York: Random House, 
1954), 160. Hereinafter cited as Stuart, Fifty Years. ---
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and compromising, if not inconspicuous and subservient. .ti.is 
chief virtu.e was in perf ormi.ng his assigned. tasks •with supreme 
obedience and confidence, even if witnout the greatest elan. 
It was along the line of conforming inth directives, moreover, 
that Marshall seems on one occasion to have shown a rare high-
spiritedness. General Wedemeyer writes that ,-.1:1en Marshall arrived 
in China, he \Wedemeyer J ca.l.mly undertook to inform the General 
that his mission was impossible in the face of the Marxist-Lenin-
ist aspirations of the Chinese Communists and the sent:i..lnent for 
demobilization in the United States. In a rare mood of personal 
vindictiveness, ¥.iarshall angrily retorted to Wedemeyer, 11 I am 
going to accomplish this mission, and you are going to help me. 114 
But the episode is isolated in the annals of history, and 
certainly Marshall had in no degree the aggressiveness and drive of 
a man like Wedemeyer, though, f course, he was not handicapped vr.i..th 
Wedemeyer• s extreme prejudices, either. :;Jedemeyer, in fact., has 
gone so far as to suggest that Ha.rshall was perhaps prejudiced against 
the Kuomintang because he had read the Stilwell reports, written 
by General George Stilwell, who served in China from 1942 to 1944, 
represented Chiang as the inept source of all t hat was wrong ·with 
China, and was consequently finally relieved of his command partly 
because Chiang had applied the pressure which led up to General 
4Albert c. Wedemey:er, Wedemeyer Reports ~New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1958), 369. 
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Hurley's request for a new commander in the China Theater.> 
The truth of the c~-:i.rge is doubtful. All reports of 1'1arshall 
in China show him always striving to obey his directives, which, 
if they gave any edge, almost unfailingly gave it to the National-
ist Goven1it1ent. 
Paradoxically, Marshall's greatest strength, his great 
popularity with the American people, may have been at the same time 
his greatest liability for dealing ,;,ti.th the Chinese situation. 
John Leighton Stuart writes that, at the ti.me Marshall secured his 
appointment as the United States Ambassador to China, Marshall ncould 
have had from the American people whatever he wanted ; 116 and in. 
putting forth Marshall's name to succeed James F. Byrnes as the 
.American Secretary of State, Senator Claude A. Pepper of Florida. 
proclaimed h:i1n as the man 11 than whom no American today is more 
greatly honored nor more highly esteemed." Such popular currency, 
as Hook notes, can be a misleading factor in studies which deal 
with history, politics, and diplomacy. "There is no reliable 
5Ibid., 370. 
6stuart, Fifty~' 166. 
7congressional Record, 80 Congress, l Session l~lashington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 194'7), XLIII, 368. 
40 
correlation, 11 he writes, 
bet·ween historical significance, measured by the effect 
of action on events, and historical fame, measured by acc-
laim or volume of eulogy. That is why the judgment of 
the scientific historian, vfuo investigates specific causal 
_' connection, on the historical work of individuals, is always 
to be preferred to results of polls, comparative space allot-
ments in standard works, and frequency of citation. T'ne lat-
ter show enonnous variation influenced by fashion, picturesque-
ness, parti pris, and very little by scientific findings. 
Particular y today, any •front• man can be built up into a 
•hero.' From 1916 to 19.33, Hindenburg was undoubtedly the 
most popular figure in Germany, but one could mention half a 
dozen individuals who had greater influence on German history, 
including military history, during the period.l5 
Moreover, such popularity would prove a handicap to Marshall if he 
should not be able to rise above the current strains of popular 
poll tical sentiment. His aptitudes, however, point in another 
direction. Marshall had risen to his high office on the crest of 
a f ashion which was in the embryonic stages of progressing toward 
monolitltlc efficiency of the type i-mich put the premium upon unquest-
ioning confonnity.9 This conformity, indeed, seemed to be Marshall's 
forte. Truman writes of the selection of Marshall for the mediation 
task that Marshall, in his belief, was the right man for the job, 
8.aarold C. Hartin and Richard H. Ohmann, edd., In~uiry and 
Expression \New York: Rinehart and Company, 1959), 39- O. -
9senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, for instance, was getting his 
wish for a bipartisanship in foreign policy which found the sole 
basis for agreement in the anti-Communist stand which most .Americans 
felt must be increasingly adamant. See A.H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., 
The Private Papers of Sena.tor Vandenberg lBoston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1§52), 351~52. 
because: 
• • • he was deeply steeped in democracy and sincerely 
believed in letting the people detennine their own fate. 
He was a firm believer in the principle of civilian sup-
remacy over the mili ta.ry as a principle that not only 
applied in the United States but ·was essential to the wel-
fare of any nation.10 
Those imo would have forced unity on China, like Hurley or Wede-
mey er, by "ramming it down t heir throats, n were the wrong men in 
Truman I s estimation. 11 It would take a more docile make of man 
for 'What Truman seemlllgly had in mind: nTo achieve a proper and 
.fair appraisal of Marshall•s mission, 11 Truman continues, 
it is necessary to bear in m:ind that even before he left 
for China there already existed a f onnal a greement in 
writing between the Central Govem-nent and t he Communists 
to work toward national unity ••• My sole purpose in 
sending him was to help carry out a program willingly sub-
scribed to byi:.the Chinese leaders. In no sense was it our 
intention to impose our will up on the Chinese people.12 
If Truman meant to let the Chine e have their ·way, there can be 
little question that Marshall was the right man f or the job. Yet 
the question remains as to whether the increasingly anti-Comnmnist 
mold of the .federal government, as re.fleeted in the confonnist mind 
of General Marshall, as well a s in the intention to hinge t he economic 
aid which would have gone furthest toward democratizat i on, did not 
lOHarry S. Truman, Memoirs lGarden City : Doubleday ani Company, 




prefix into the mediating apparatus a principle which negated 
personal effort. Certainly, Marshall, picked because he believed 
in what the administration was trying to do, was faced with the 
prospect of tailoring his actions to a pre-f orrm1lation of policy 
which militated against any ld.nd of momentary contrivance to suit 
the needs of that moment. 
CHAPTER N 
THE SB.TTING OF THE Mt1.RSHALL HISSION 
AND ITS DIPLOMACY 
A. Political, YJilitary, and :Economic 
Situa:bion of Postwa.rChina 
The political situation in China following World War II 
was much as has been pointed up by the introductory chapters of 
this paper: the Corrnnu.nists and Nationalists faced each other 
from positions that were poles apart, and the t hird parties either 
found themselves temporarily allied to the Corrnnunists in opposition 
to Kuomintang reaction, or el se they suffered some degree of ineff-
ectualness. The Chinese Conrrnuni.sts, moreover, in spite of their 
reported minority r ating, had insisted on political equality, at 
least for the time being, and hence had d.i3obeyed the General Order 
Number 1 of August 14, 1945, delivered by General Douglas Ma cArthur, 
then in comrnand of' the Pacific Theater of Operations, that only Nat-
ionalist troops were to accept the surrender of the Japanese.1 The 
Communists had cont:inued to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, 
seize their material, and occupy surrendered territory. The result 
was a series of skirmishes with Government troops which were in the 
process of spreading, with the result that chances f or internal peace 
seemed dim. 
1Perhaps portentious of the events which were to follow, it 
was General Marshall vlho advised MacArthur to issue the order. See 
Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Comrmmists, 1931-
1946 (New York: Columbia University "Press, l95ts ), 197. 
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Political opposition was thus so mutually adamant that 
it soon became military opposition. The key to the mill tary 
situation in the minds of both factions and their sponsors was 
the control of Manchuria.2 General Wedemeyer, then in charge of 
the China Theater in 1946, reported to Washington on November llt., 
1945, that the National Government was completely unprepared to 
take over Manchuria in the face of Communist opposition. His 
subsequent report of November 20, 1945, read: 
I have recommended to the Generalissimo that he shoul d 
concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in north 
China and upon the prompt execution of political and off icial 
reforms designed to rffinove the practices of corruption by 
officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes.3 
Wedemeyer, in also recommending the utilization of foreign executives 
and technicians, at least dur:Lrig the period of transition, also 
claimed that 111ogistical support for National Gover-ronent forces and 
measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria. have not been 
fully appreciated. by··.the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff; 11 4 and 
thus that the Co:rnmunist guerillas and saboteurs could restrict the 
Nationalist anny to south China if they so desired. Wedemeyer bel-
ieved that Chiang could stabilize the situation in south China, pro-
vided he accept 11 the assistance of foreign administrators and tech-
2u. s. Department of State, United States Relations~~, 
w.i.th Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office-;--!950), f30:--Here1.nafter cited as Dept. of 




nicians and engage in poli tica.l, economic, and social refonr.s 
through honest civilian officials." There was the additional 
possibility that the situation in north China could also be 
stabilized., "provlded a satisfactory agreement with the Chinese 
Comnnmists is achieved.11 and reforms made.5 The occupation of 
Manchuria, however, Wedemeyer deemed to hinge upon satisfactory 
settlements 1-r.i.th both Russia and China, "Whose potentialities 
for mutual collusion he readily realized. But at the samv time 
he concluded that, 11It appears re.11ote that a satisfactory under-
standing vd.11 be reached between the Chinese Communists and the 
National Government. 116 Wedemeyer : s final suggestion was that a 
trusteeship by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia should 
be established over l".i.a.nchuria until such time as the National 
Government could rehabilitate itself, cleanse itself of corruption, 
and asSTu71e control of the area.7 Noting that abuses by the National-
ists in the areas they took over from Japan had already done nmch to 
alienate support from the Nationalists, 11edemeyer recommended the 
trusteeship as a means of avoiding embarrassment. 
Meanwhile, the prospective battle lines were already being 
d.rmm. 11The Cormnu.n:i.sts, 11 writes Herbert Feis, 
'Ibid. 
6~., 132. 
7Wedemeyer himself says that he recoi:rmended a Five Power trust-
eeship, including also France and China. See ·1bert C. Wedemey~r, 
,,.Jedemeyer Reports ,New York: HerlT'IJ Holt and Company, 1950), 346. 
Hereinafter citeci as Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports. 
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through guerilla and local units and regular forces as 
well, were securely established in the area east and 
north of Peiping, in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar boroer 
region around Kalgan, and at various points in Shantung 
and other land approaches to Manchuria. They dominated 
some sections of the rai road north from Peiping.ts 
Simultaneously, American planes ;;ere edeploying Nation · s troop 
in areas which ~rould give t hem possib e access t north China 
Manchuria Fifty thousand American marine ere landed in t he a: 
of 1945, and planes redep eyed from 400,000 to 500,000 Chinese 
Government troops in areas around 'Shanghai, Nank:i.ng, Peip ' g, 
and other critical secto s along the North China coast. 119 te-
dating possible attempts at mediatio as these movements hey 
involved the United St.ates n a quandary which would be ope to 
Communist eJq:>loitation, if, as Wedemeyer and others were beginning 
to assert, the Communists entertained more than short-range pans 
l!i'ven as Molotov stress that the Soviet Union wou d bea 11no respo -
sibility for internal af ai s or developments within China," the 
Chinese Communist Field Ma sha , Ch Teh, edged on Octobe 5, 945, 
a protest with the American 11'1tba.ssy in Chungld.ng against 11.A.me · can 
tsHerbert Feis, The China Trl e; American Ef'fort in 
from Pearl Harbo to the Rirs'hall~lission tPrinceton: Prince'f:on 
University Press, !95'3); 377. tJhat the Col1l11Unists seeme to lack 
initially in manpower ms apparently counterbalanced by the strategic 
importance of the positions they held . Hereinafte cited as Feis, 
Tangle. 
9charles B. 1c1a.ne, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 3 -
1946 \,Hew York: Columbia University Press'; -mtl), 202a Herei nafte --
cited as McLane , Soviet Policy. 
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interference in Ch:i.na•s internal affairs. 1110 Meanwhile, the 
Communist factions were attempting to keep their reccrd outvrardly 
clean. On November 25, Chinese Communist spokesmen professed that 
they were on "very friendly" terms with Chiang; and on November 25, 
Chu Teh told several .American correspondents tha t the Communists 
had no objection to Nationalist troop movewents, but the point at 
i ssue was t heir conveyance by A,,1erican fore es through a reas vmich 
had been 11liberated11 by the Cornmu_nist &ghth Route Am.y.ll At about 
this aame time, the Yenan 11:nancipation Daily opined: 
'Ille problem of whethvr t he sending of troops to Horth Ch:L."la. 
and ·.;a.r1churia i s still necessary and whethe r American help 
shall be needed for this purpose should first be submitted 
to the Political Consultative Conference for dis~ission . 
otherwise the movement would be contravening President Trumc.1.n ts 
statement that the United States support will not be extended 
to United States military intervention to influence the course 
of Chinese internal strife.12 
Meanwhile, the economic situation in China i,ras sorely depressed 
arrl was contribut:L."1g, along with the repressive policies of the 
Euomintang, to dissatisfaction which stimulated political ferment. 
In some cases there had been large-scale popular defections to the 
cause of Communist economic democracy. Herbert Feis S'l.l!llrilarizes the 
situation succinctly by noting that China had no foreign trade, that 
ninety per cent of the railways were out of operation, and t hat, more-
10roid., 204. 
11~., 212. 
12As quoted in ~-, 213. 
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over, the standstill in commerce was manifesting itsel.f by sky-
rocketing in.flation.13 The productive potential of agriculture, 
mining, and industry in the areas which had been taken from the 
Japanese, however, remained potentially high. fut here again, r~~ch 
of the hope for post·war prosperity was contingent upon dislodging 
the Communists from crucial areas, principally Manchuria. As Dean 
Acheson noted in retrospect, 11 'Il1e expulsion of the Japanese from 
H.a.nchuria and Formosa promised to increase several-fold the national 
industrial plant and to contribute to the achievement of a national 
self-sufficiency in food. 1114 The critical part which economic fact-
ors were to play during the attempts to re-establish civil peace 
is obvious in the reports which were later to circulate from China 
during the mediation attempts. Gunther Stein, f or instance, reported 
in 1945 that the hills along the Shansi-Chaha.r-Hopei border, where 
the Corrnmmists were entrenched., were 11 sprinkled with green fields 
on the side of the Border region, 11 while they wer e "bar r en and empt y 
on the To1omintang side. 1115 Such a situation en.a.bled Mao Tse-tung and 
his companions to make their most eff ective political pitches t o t he 
Chinese populace. By t he "new Three Principl es of t he People, 11 Mao 
l3Feis, Tangle, 3.55. 
14m Dept. of State, Relations ~, 127. 
l.5Gunther Stein, The Cha.lle~e .£! (New York: NcGra.w-
Hill Book Company, 194TI; 460. ereinafter cited as Stein, Challenge. 
is quoted by Stein as saying hte in 1945, 11the government is 
to belong to the people ar:d nmst not be monopolized by the few; 1116 
and no doubt many Chinese at the time were imagining that prosperity 
was being monopolized by the few. The effect was so overwhelming, 
Stein reports, that even the best men in the headquarters of the 
Kuomintang were hid.:ing a tendency to realize 11 the superiority of 
Yenan is methods over those of Chw1gking. nl 7 
'lhe Communists, by retaining a lien upon Manchuria, had 
gained access to the great industrial equipment and potential which 
the Japanese had built and an agricultural area that was capable of 
producing an appreciable ~--cport surplus f or China. :Manchuria had 
only one-ninth of the population of China proper and one-fourth of 
the area; and it now had an industrial potential fou r times as great 
as China, an electric generating capacity three tL--nes as large, and 
a rail density four times as gr t .18 
Such economic depression and the poor prospect of regaining 
}1anchuria more than overbalanced China's favorable position on the 
foreign exchange, 1~1ich largely consisted of large reserves of gold 
and American dollar exchange, estimated to total over 900 million 
dollars on December 31, 1945.19hverythinB depended upon the re-est-
l6Ibid., 457. 
17Ibid. 
18nept. of State, Relations China, 128. 
l9Ibid. , 129. 
so 
abllshment of nonnal internal trade, and the subsequent resumpt-
ion of large-scale imports of food and industrial raw materials. 
In transportation, the war damage had been crucial, and had placed 
an obstacle to Chinese domestic and foreign trade which the retaking 
of }ianchuria could begin to alleviate. 
The victorious allies, at the close of the war, had tried 
several measures to help the Chinese with economic reconstruction. 
Such scattered activities as the United Nations Relief and Rehabil-
itation Administration, Lend-lease, Economic Cooperation Ad.iitlnistrat-
ion, loans and assorted credits were tried with no appreciable effect. 
As is noted in United States Relations ~, irthe ultimate 
soundness of the international financial position depended ••• on 
the spped with ~lh.ich export industries a_nd remittances from Chinese 
overseas regained their prewar levels; 1120and George Moorad s:ings the 
inglorious epitaph on the scattere aid which Bas extended immediately 
after the war: 
So nmch trick bookkeeping is involved, so much question about 
funds earmarked but never released, that it is almost meaning-
less to discuss American aid in tenns of dollars. By the most 
generous estimates, the sum was rut a drop i n the sea of China•s 
troubles, and that little was mishandled.21 
Moreover, economic disruption and weakness can clearly be seen 
in relation to internal and international machinations which were then 
20I bid., 130. 
21aeorge Moorad, Lost Peace in China (New York: .c:. P. Dutton 
Company, 1949), 193. Hereinaftercited as Moorad, ~• 
being carried out. Wedemeyer, in ruminating on his own suggestion 
for Chiang to regain control over north China, recalled the stipul-
ation in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August, 1945, which required 
Russia 11 to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies 
and other material resources, such support and aid to be given to 
the Nationalist Government as the reco~nized Government of China. . 1122 
0 
Yet, the Russian policy had been to keep China nweak and disunited. 11 23 
11 I now for t he first t:ime realized the economic implications of rrry 
reco1mnendations, 11 Wedemeyer writes at this time, 11but::..in all honesty 
I had not given this factor any thought when I made them originalJ.y. 1124 
Thus, as the Marshall :Mission began, the political, military, 
and economic situations were all interrelated with the common base 
in the problem of national unification; and national unification, 
it seemed from the outset, woul d be achieved under the hegemony of 
that power which could control 'Mane 1uria. In this sense, the mission, 
concurrent with the Yalta Agreement and postdating the Sino-Soviet 
acco:ro of August, 1945, took economic factors more explicitly into 
consideration than had the Hurley Nission. 'Ihe success of the 
¥iarsball Mission depended upon unification under the leadership of 
Chiang; and this admittedly dppended, in turn, largely upon the 




return of Manchuria to 11Chinese sovereignty"--or to the control 
of the Nationalist Government. Hurley•s Five-Point Draft Program 
of November 10, 1945, on the other hand, looked chiefly to polit-
ical settlement as t he pract ical thing, providing for: 1 ) Nation-
alist-Gomr.runist cooperation for unification and reconstruction, 
2) a democratic coalition government of all anti~·Japanese parties, 
3) support of the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a Bill of Rights, 
4) coordination of all military activities by a United National 
Military Council, and 5 )·:.the recognition of all anti-Japanese 
parties.25 The Counter-Proposal promptly made by the Nationalists, 
however, set down the essence of policy which t he United States -was 
largely to follow throughout the Marshall :Mission. Its clear :import 
was t..1.e supremacy of the Kuomintang, as it called f or: 1) incorpor-
ation of Comnru.nist troops into the Nationalist Anny, 2) Nationalist 
control of all troops and co trol of the National Military Council, 
and 3) a pledge to "carry outn the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 
B. Diplomacy 2.£ M.a.rshall Mission 
'lhe resignation of General Hurley as special pr esi dential 
envoy to China came as a surprise to President Truman and to Sec-
retary of State Byrnes; and no successor to Hurley had been contem-





During the cabinet meeting which took place to choose 
Hurley; s successor, Truman in fact remarked that he had been 
considering the quiet, soft-spoken Marshall for the more demure 
position as chairman of the American Red Cross. On the suggestion 
that Marshall could take up the task as mediator on a temporary 
basis, however, Trurna.n agreed to the appointment, and on November 
27, 1945, upon the acceptance of Hurley;s resignation, Truman 
simultaneously annOUJ."lced. the appointment of ¥.1arshall as his special 
representative in China, with the personal rank of Ambassador. 
Marshall himself did not participate in the conferences 
which culminated in the dra:w:ing-up of the policy statement of 
December 15, since he was busy testifying before the Congressional 
Pearl Harbor inquiry.28 This accident may perhaps account for the 
narrowness of the path which policy gave Marshall to walk in calling 
for a 11 strong, united, and democratic China, 11 and yet withholding 
economic aid until such time as that hope should be ma.de a fact. 
27 James V. Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 
1951), 113. 
28There are two versions of the casting of the policy statement . 
Acheson asserts that Marshall .-rrote his ovm directives because he 
disapproved. 013 By:rnes•s. This is unlikely, however, in view of Ha.rsh-
all• s presence at the Pearl Harbor hearings . See U. S. Senate, Mil-
itary Situation in the Far F.ast, 82 Congress, 1 Session (~la.shington: 
U. s. Govt. Prin"tingOffice-;-!°§51), !848. Hereinafter cited as U • S • 
Senate, V.d.lita.ry Situation!!::~~~• 
54 
Moreover, a.s the State Department was later to note, "This obvious-
ly meant modification of the Kuomintang•s system of •political 
tutelagei .:1.and the broadening of the base of government. 0 29 
A further disadvantage under which the mission sought to 
accomplish its task ·was that, since the mediator was an American 
and the United States policy statement had cited the interest of 
the United States and the United Nations in pacifying and unifying 
China, the mission appeared to be foreign meddling in Chinese i ntern-
I 
al affairs. This was excused on the grounds that political ferment 
should cease before the crucial economic aid was extended. As 
Latourette writes: 
A direct participation in China's internal affairs was ex-
cused by the reasoning that a China. torn by civil strif e was 
not a proper place for American economic assistance i n t he 
form of credits or technical skills or military aid.30 
Marshall, upon arri · g in China on Jarmary 4, l ~li6, spent 
t he initial days of his mission talking to American observers. In 
particular, he talked to General Tedemeye r; and it was at this time 
that iedemeyer made the r emar k about the impossibility of the mission 
which aroused Marshall is anger.31 
29J)ept. of State, Rel ati ons with China., 133. --------
30Kenneth s. Latourette, The American Record in the~~, 
1%5-1951 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 199. 
3lu. S. Senate, Mill t ary Situation ~, 2305 • 
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'lne following day, however, Marshall flew to Nanldng 
and began his ta]Jcs with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Wedemeyer• s 
pronouncement on this initial session--that he "began to feel 
confident that these t wo men would cooperate in the task that 
32 
lay before them11 --was perhaps the tipoff to the way the medi ation 
would be received by the Comnmn:i.sts in the end, especially in 
view of Wedemeyeris appointment as Ambas sador being rejected a 
short time later at the objection of the Chinese Communists. 
Certainly, the initial visitation to Chiang before any pilgrimage 
to fenan, together with the recent American activity in the redeploy-
ment of Nationalist troops quickly gave rise to a. school of thought 
which contended that the strength of Chiang 1-ro.s primarily nthe strength 
of Americans imo supported him. 1133 
1. The cease-fire of January 13, 1946: momentary peace in the 
of mutu:a1-;-ana: not entirery-dormant, truculence:- -
The first stage of Marshall's mission was a s~onal success, 
resulting in the effecting of a cease-fire 1mich many had called 
11 impossible.u In retrospect, however, it seems t hat t he truce of 
January, 1946, was more of a foibw-through on t he agreement of 
November 11, 1945~~w'nich both Nationalists and Communists seem to 
32wedameyer, Wedemeyer Reports, 366-367. 
33claude A. Buss, \New York: The Macmill an Company, 
1955), 453. 
34see pages 42-4.3 of this paper. 
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have signed for propaganda purposes--than it was a decision 
ma.de upon the momentary suasion of Marshall. In oroer to win 
popular suffrage in the face of a desire for peace, both sides 
agreed to the truce. The Communists, almost as if they lmew by 
premonition what good capital the Marshall Mission would eventually 
make for anti-Nationalist and anti-American propaganda, swallowed 
American and Nationalist proposals wholesale at the negotia tions 
table. Finally, given this raison i'~, the truce was an uneasy 
one, with both sides trying to push the other into an incident 
which would re-trigger the civil war. 
E.'ven as Marshall had first arrived in China on the fourth 
of January, it was obvious that mutual animosities were goi..rig to 
continue to loom hard on the Chinese horizon. On the first, Govern-
ment forces had an.~ounced their intention to take Jehol Province. 
The Communists, of course, countered thi s with a resolve to resist 
the move.35 It ·was surprising--and yet not surprising--then, that 
when Marshall, in his initial meeting in.th the Commander of the 
Chinese Comrrru.nist armies, Chou En-lai, announced. t hat American trans-
port planes would move Nationalist troops into North China, Chou 
agreed to the movement,s in spite of Chu Teh ' s earlier protests .36 
In the faee of the continuing enmity mixed with ostensible 
willingness to negotiate, Marshall attempted to restrict his activities 
3S 11strife Looms over Jehol Province, 11 The New York Times, January 
2, 1946, Sec. 1, J. - - - -
36nept. of State, Relations ~, 130. 
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to the most inobtrusive kind of diplomacy. According to the 
State Department, he: 
acted both as an intermediary between Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek and the representatives of the Chinese Communist 
Party and as an adviser to, or membm- of, certain bodies 
or com,_,tlttees 1,fnich were established in the effort to reach 
agreement on China's problems. He also exercised initiative 
in giving each side i mpartially and confidentially the bene-
fit of his analysis of the situation as it developed, and 
in drafting various statements and a9r eements which he t hought might move the negotiations forward.~7 
This role was somewhat at variance 1,r.ith the more active 
one which Secretary Byrnes had imagined. Byrnes, accoro.ing to Her-
bert Feis, had wanted a strong, unified China precisely so that Russia 
would not be able to retain control of 11a.nchuria and maintain any 
influe."1.ce in north China. He had thought t hat ttthe central idea of 
the program was to put enough weapons in Marshall• s hand to induce 
the Government arrl the Communists to get together. 1138 But Truman, 
quite to the contrary, had disavowed any thought of imposi.rig the will 
of the United States upon China by force; 39 and thus, 11r•furshall, 11 as 
Feis writes, 11was still perplexed as to how he was expected to use 
37Ibid., 134. 
3 8Herbert Feis, The China Tangle; The American Effort in China 
from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mis sioil\Princeton: Princeto~ 
uii'iversity Press., I95TT; 410. Hereinafter cited as Feis, !!:! China. 
Tangle. 
39Harry s. Truman, Memoirs \Garo.en City: Doubleday and Company, 
1955), II, 368. Hereinafter cited as Truman, :Memoirs. 
56 
these weapons. 114° The withdrawal of American marines was postponed 
and the China Theater was continued. Neither of these facts, however, 
were put to positive use by :Marshall, in spite of his authorization 
to do so by the State Department directive to Wedemeyer.41 With the 
reluctance of Marshall to br:L.'1.g strategic military pressure to bear 
upon influencing the course of negotiations, Molotov early gave 
indications that it would be the Communists who would capitalize, 
for propaganda purposes, upon the presence of American troops in 
China. Almost simultaneously vdth General Chou•s agreeing to the 
Am.erican transport of Government troops, P...olotov i<JaS asserting from 
Moscow that .American troops were no longer necessary and was demanding 
their withdrawal.42 
On January 6, after Marshall had met 11ith Chiang, the 
Nationalist Government proposed the assembling of a three-man comm-
ittee to discuss the terms of a truce. On January 7, this committee 
held its first meeting, ·with General Marshall serving in the capacity 
of chairman, General Chang Chun representing the Nationalists, and 
4° Feis, The Tangle, 410. 
41.rbid., 420. Troops could b e used in consistency with the 
negotiations, as !:1a.rshall determined, or when Harsha.TI should deter-
mine that the negotiations had failed. It is probably fair to note, 
however, that it was ·Jedemeyer, and not Ha rshall, 1.;mo was Th.eater 
Conn ander. 
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General Chou .hn-lai the Communists; and on January 8, the 
Political Consultative Conference, formed during the Hurley 
mission, met to discuss its agenda, even as the Communists were 
announcing the capture of Chihfeng.43 
The specter of armed strife never relented. Immediately, 
Marshall encountered mutual suspicions in the meetings of ·Uie 
Committee of Three. The Nationalists were aroused over Comnmnist 
designs on Hanchuria, while the Communists were of a mind that the 
Kuomintang was bent on the complete destruction of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Chou Eb-lai, consequently, announced at this 
time that continued Communist participation in the negotiations 
depended. upon the Kuomintangis manifesting a desire for democratic 
refonn..44 
Still, the Committee of Three agreed on a cease fire on 
January 10. All troop movements were to cease immediately, except 
for Government movements to the North; and an Executive Headquarters 
was to effect and police the truce by means of three-man truce teams 
made up of Nationalist, Communist, and .4merican repr esentatives who 
uould issue orders 11in the name of the President of the Republic 
43 11Marshall Meets with Chiang, 11 The New York Times, January 7, 
1946, Sec. 28, 2; 11Conmru.nists Report Capture of'ch"Ilifeng, 11 ~-, 
January 8, 1946, Sec. 3, 1. 
44u. s. Departr;1ent of State, Fore~ Relations.£!:~ United 
States, ~lomtic Papers: China \Was gton: u. s. Government 
Printing fice, i956), 06. --ire'reinafter cited as ! . .!!• 
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of China..,t4.5'1he truce, effective on January 13, was supposedly 
a nonpolitical truce.46 According to General Claire L. Chennault, 
the famed 11Flying Tiger," "Some fifty truce teams ••• were 
dispatched to trouble spots all over China. Each was headed by 
an elderly American colonel specially picked for his white hair 
to impress the Chinese. 114'7 Thus, even such aspects as hair color 
and physiognomy were supposed to carry more weight than political 
alignment. Moreover, as George Moorad writes: 
The officers of General George C. 11arshall is truce teams 
in China, who stood in the front lines of this great 
ideological conflict, were required to sign a pledge that 
they would not discuss political issues.4b 
The terms of the truce itself, however, in providing for 
an exemption for northward Nationalist troop movements , reflected 
the coinciding wishes of both the United States and the Kuomintang 
that Nationalist sovereignty over Manchuria be secured; and it is 
with some symptoms of wearing the blinkers that Here then becoming 
conventional that President Trurnan l auded Harshall Is keeping out 
45Dept. of State, Relations~~, 609. 
4&.. s u •• Senate, Military Situation~~~~, US51 . 
47claire L. Chennault, Way _9! Fighter (New York: G. P. Put-
nam Sons, 1949), xi.ii. 
41\-roorad, ~, 102. 
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o£ political affairs at this juncture.49 
By January 14, spokesmen for both factions were reporting 
that fighting had either ended or subsided ever-.rwhere in China; arid 
a demonstration of Chinese students in Shanghai was urging United 
States troops to return home. But on January 16, both sides 
issued mutual charges of military attack; and on the twentieth, 
in a preview of what the genetic dualism in China might eventually 
portend, four American fliers were detained by Soviet troops stat-
ioned at Chihfeng.50 
Friction, moreover, was reflected in the continuing nego-
tiations, as was the tacit pro-Kuomintang bias of the very bases 
of those negotiations. The Political Consu.ltative Conference remained 
in session from January 14 to January 31, deliberating on the problems 
of government organization, reconstruction, military reorganization, 
the composition of the proposed National Assembly, and the status of 
the 1936 draft constitution, ratification of which had been post poned 
by the occurrence of World 1 far II. During the extended session, both 
the United States and the Nationalists, i~1ile willing to recognize 
the legality of all anti-Japanese parties, nevertheless insisted upon 
the national leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the recognition of 
that leadership by these parties as a~ pro quo f or the retention 
49Truman, Memoirs, II, 6lj. 
5011 chinese Students Urge U. s. Troops to Go Home, 11 The New York 
T:unes January 15, 1946, Sec. ill-, 2; 11U. s . Fliers Detainoo by U-:S:S.R. , . 
Troops, 11 ~•, January 21, 1946, Sec. 7, 1. 
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of legal status.SI 
Members of the proposed supreme goverrm1ent organ, the 
State Council, moreover, were to be appointed by the 11 President 
of the National Government, 11 Ch.i.ang Ifa.i-shek • .52 Also, the constit-
uency of the National Assembly, vhlch was to a.mend and ratify the 
1936 draft constitution, 1ras to be determined by an electoral law 
which kept the Kuomintang delegates decidedly in the plurality. 
Of 2, 050 to·tal delegates, 1,200 were to be retained from geograph-
ical apportionments which favored Kuomintang-held areas; 150 delegates 
were, someimat inappreciably, to be allotted to the Northeast Prov-
inces and Taiwan; and 700 more were to be proportioned among 11various 
parties and social leaders, 11 presumably by the unilateral fiat of 
the elements who were controlling the negotiations.53 T'nese proposals 
naturally aroused the opposition of the leftist Democratic League 
as well as that, of the Communists . On January 17, both dissident 
groups went on record as favoring open general elections for the 
National Assembly. Outside the negotiations, this balkiness aroused 
reactionary fervor in the right wing of the Kuomintang. On January 
25, the house of one of the members of the Democratic League 1vas 
sacked by the Kuomintang Secret Police, a maneuver which prompted 
the League to threaten a complete boycott of the future meetings of 




the Political Consultative Conference ~P. C. C.).54 Nevertheless, 
the final resolutions of the P. c. c., delivered on January 31, 
reflected the predominant position of the Nationalists: the 
National Assembly was to convene on May 5, 1946, to adopt the 
constitution, revising the 1936 draft constitution along the line 
of the principles agreed upon by the P . C. C., and its constituency 
was to be determined according to the Nationalist proposal; the 
organic law -wa.s to be revised to make the 40-man State Council the 
supreme organ of the national government, its membership uas to be 
appointed. by Chiang with some consideration to a.pportiomnent of 
the non-Kuomintang minority to be reserved to future sessions; and 
the President was to have a veto ove r the Council vr.i.th a three-fifths 
vote required to override it, although a mere maj ority vote was to 
be enough for a change in administrative policy.55 
While :Marshall purported.l" steered clear of polit ical matters 
at this point, did not a.ct as mediator during the January session 
of the P. c. c., and thus, by default, contributed to an early 
Nationalist edge in the negotiations, his efforts in behalf of 
pennanent peace were unflagging. 11 To lend the strength of his 
influence to the cease-fire agreement bet ween the t wo Chinese armies, 11 
Truman writes, 
54unemocrat ic League Threatens Boycott, 11 New ~, 
January 27, 1946, Sec. 19, 1. 
55 ,1. Dept. of State, Relations~~, 139-J..LI.O• 
64 
~Jarshall undertook a three-thousand mile flight through 
northern China all the uay to the borders of Inner Non-
golia • He talked to all the principal commanders in the 
field and reported to me that he had been able to promote 
a general understanding throughout ·Le region af the pur-
poses of the cease-fire and of the machinery that had been 
set up to enforce it.56 
While in Yenan., VJ.arshall talked w:i.. th the Comnru.nist political leader, 
Nao Tse-tung, who seemed appr eciative of Viarsha.11 1 s role as peace 
mediator and waxed eloquent on the prospects of democratic govern-
ment in China.57 
The truce, of course, was never effected to perfection. As 
early as February 5, there were reports of Comr:nmist attacks upon 
three villages in the border r egion of North China; and in reprisal 
a new resurgence of reaction started five days later and continued 
throughout the rest of the month .58 Yet Marshall retained confidence 
in the idea that once a milita l"'J settlement had been effected, pol-
itical discussions could ensue i refinement from military pres~~re. 
This confidence is evidenced in his request to President Truman early 
in February t o tenninate the China Theater of Operations. Even as 
he had written the President on February 9 t hat continued Russian 
presence in Manchuria was developing into a nrestering situation, 11 
S6Truman, Memoirs, II, 74. 11 H.is correct view of his mission was 
that he was to bring the fighting to an end, if possibl e, and he took 
pains to avoid matters that were wholly political in _1ature • 11 
57Ibid., 78. 
>511 communists Attack Three Vill ages, 11 The New York Times, February-
6, 1946, Sec. 1, 4; "Right wing Kuomintang violence, 11 I bid., February ll, 
1946, Sec. 9, l; 11Democratic League Protests,"~-, Februa~J 12, 1946 , 
Sec. 14, J ; "Anticommunist Viol ence, 11~., February 23, 1940, Sec. 9,1; 
11Anticommunis t Vichlence,u ~-, February 25, 1946, Sec. 9, 2. 
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which piqued the Nationalist Army,59 :Marshall, on the t welfth, 
for the purpose of avoiding 1t the inevitable Ru.ssian recriminations 
similar to those today regarding the British troops in Greece, 11 60 
recommended tennination of the China Theater and simultaneous 
evacuation of American marines, leaving only the military advisory 
group and a marine detachment for "reconnaissance and transportation 
and some housekeeping and local guard units. 11 61 
Truman replied that plans for t he movement of Chinese armies 
to Manchuria could not be completed before September 1, 1946, and 
that logistical support for these armies would have to be extended 
until October 31, 1946; but a t the same t.ime he expressed a sympath-
etic an::dety to get .American forces out of China a s quickly as possible.62 
E.'vidently, any plan of using American fore.es to apply occasional 
pressures consistent with the negotiations was compl etely dropped in 
f avor of winning the favor of world acquittal from the a l l egations of 
the Soviet Union. 
2. The Accord on Military Demobilization and Re-
organization: the mediating party is carried along~ 
one faction as result nonpo!itical policy. 
The second major development of the Marshall Mission was the 




accord on military reorganization, reached on February 25, 1946. 
This was the crucial step in an attempt to insure that the truce 
would develop into a lasting peace by providing for the reduction 
of both Communist and Kuomintang forces and their integration into 
a national army Hhich, ideally, would be nonpolitical in character. 
But at this critical point, the Communists, who felt they were 
getting the worst of negotiations and t hat, t~ule t hey could accept 
temporary submission, they could not accept it permanently, balked. 
Thereupon, Marshall, as the straight-line mediator in behalf of a 
mediating policy which had originally leaned with near-i.1"@erceptibility 
toward one faction, was now carried along 11:i.th that faction in an 
equally imperceptible manner almost precisely because of the 11non-
political11 import his mission was presently supposed to carry. 
The Communists had been t he first to violate openly the resolutions 
by failing to present a list of t heir troops to fu{ecutive .tleadquarters . 
Hence, Harshall, ostensibly quite nonpolitically, began to find himself 
lining up 'With the Nationalists. 
From February 14, 1946, to February 25, the three-man committee 
on military affairs, with ·ia.rshall sitting in an advisory capacity, 
Chou En-lai representing the Corrnnunists, and General Chih-chung the 
National Government, deliberated on the policy of reduction and integra-
tion.63 Agreement was reached on the twenty-fifth and promul gated in 
63nept. of State, Pi.elations ~, 140. 
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a document entitled, "Ba.sis for Military Reorganization and for 
the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National A.rmy. 11 
The stated purpose of the agreement was t o: 
.facilitate the economic rehabilitation of China and at 
the same time to furnish a basis for the development of 
an effective military force capable of safeguarding t he 
security of the nation, including pr ovisions to safeguard . 
the rights of the people from lawless military interference. 64 
To many obser-rors , particularly t hose propinquous to the left, 
however, the title of the agreement-- 11 Integration of t he Com:munist 
Forces into the National Arrny11 --seemed t o give the lie to its supp-
osedly rrnonpolitical" intent. 110n the strong advice of General 
Marshall, rr Kenneth Latourette tell us, the anny was to be strictly 
nonpolitical in character and alignment.6.5 The final provisions, 
however, left the Communist armies in a projected f ive-to-one minority 
in each region: ·within eighteen months, anned forces were to be 
reduced to fifty Nationalist divisions and ten Communist divisions, 
each division to be l:L"Uited to 14,000 men and receive twelve weeks 
of basic training.66 
A further directive of the military subcommittee, signed on 
}larch 16, 1946, designated the Executive Headquarters as the organ 
to implement this plan. A subgroup ·Has to be formed within the 
headquarters , to be made ttp of Nationalist, Communist and American 
64Ibid., J.41. 
65La.tourette, American Reco:ro., 21.5. 
66!. ~, 427. 
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personnel, to supervise execution of the plan. Chinese puppet 
groups of Japan were to beG.disbanded. -...ti.thin three months, a 
twelve-week training program was to be outlined, and it i-ias rec-
ommended that a Demobilized Manpower Commission be established t o 
coordinate activities 1·ri.th t he Goveniment, the Communists, civilian 
agencies, relief organizations, a.rrl t he central military headquarters.67 
3. The truce is broken: Marshall does not use American 
troops," and sothe Communists do--for propaganda purposes. 
The success of the military plan, designed to bring a halt 
to fighting so that "negotiations for political settlement could be 
carried on in an aura of peace, 11 was hardly complete.61:>.c.ven as Gen-
eral Marshall v-ias stating that this a greement represented the 11great 
hope of China, 11 the was reporting on February 27 that 
Moscow radio was beginning a new virulence a gainst the presence of 
American troops in China and :Manchuria. Fighting a gain broke out in 
Jehol Provi_nce, 69and a new flurry of rightist attacks occurred in 
Western port cities.70 
67Act ivities the Far Ea.stem Commis sion, R~ ort by the ~-
tary General, FebruafY 200946-July 10, l947 tWashington: u. s. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 19r;rf; r.-
68navid Nelson Rowe, China Among the Powers lNew York : Harcourt, 
Brace, and Company, 1946),~ - -
69ttMoscow Radio Inveighs Agains t U. s. Troops in China, U .s.s .R., 
Manchuria ir The New York Times, February 27, 1946, Sec. 16, 2; "Fighting 
in Jehol,:r ibid., Viarch ~6, Sec. 15, 1. 
7011 R:i.ghtist Attacks,"~-, March 15, 1946, Sec. 7, l. 
69 
It was at this inconvenient, time that Harshall left China 
and returned to Washington to make a report to President 'lru.man. 
Departing China on March 12, Marshall left behind him II smoldering 
animosities" which, uimmediately upon his departure • • • broke 
out afresh. 11 71 
Just before leaving China, Marshall had obtained the consent 
of Chiang I<a.i-shek for the entry of cease-fire t eams into Manchuria, 
a proposition which t he Nationalist Generalissimo had previously 
re.fused. 11In fact, 11 ,;Jri tes President Truman, 11 i t was this event 
which had led Marshall to believe he could be spared in China. 11 72 
.After Harshall le.ft, however, Chiang 11put such severe restrictions 
on the powers of the cease-fire teams that were to go into Manchuria 
that they were unable to fu.nction. 11 73 In the interim State Council, 
meanwhile, the Kuomintang had arrogated to itself t wenty of the forty 
seats, and thus had put themselv s pretty well in the driver's seat. 
Kuomintang determination for ascendancy involved, moreover, some 
duplicity in public aff airs: as the rightist terror spread unabated 
through mid~rch, for instance, the Generalissimo was pledgin.g that 
the right 1rrl.ng within the party was being suppressed and was attribut-
ing the new conflagration to internal acts of spying and sabotage 
71John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years China, the Memoirs of 
Leighton Stuart, Missionary a1:dAinbass~~New"'!ork: ~ctom 
House Publishers ,1954), 151. Hereinafter cited as Stuart, Fifty~-
72,,, M - • II 78 1ruman, ~.ttmoirs, , • 
73Ib.d 2_.•, 78-79. 
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being perpetrated. by agents of the Sov:i.et Union. 74 Chou fu-la.i, 
in turn, reiterated a sally against the reactionary clique in the 
Kuomintang and subsequently refused to file a list of Connnu.nist 
annies, their strengths, positions, and weapons with the Executive 
Headquarters on March 26, 1946, as the agreement of February 25 
had stipulated as the first step in carrying out military reorgan-
ization. 75 lie cited as an excuse the 11 justified c onipl.aint11 76t hat 
the Commander of the Nationalist forces at Canton had refused to 
recognize the authority of the r;xecutive Headquarters in his area, 
and that Nationalist annies at Nanking had failed to report movements 
to the Executive Headquarters at Peiping. Sixty thousand Comrmmist 
troops in the north Hupeh-south Honan area, moreover, were cut off 
from food supplies by an encircling cordon of Government troops.77 
The Chinese Communis t Party in riposte was meanwhile steadily 
consolidating its position in Manchuria. Thlssian withdrawal, origin-
ally scheduled for December.33, 1945, had been postponed until Feb-
ruary 1, 1946, by the Sino-Thlssian agreement signed under Western 
74chiang, Kai-shek, Soviet To.l.ssia China: S'ulmri.ng-~ 
Seventy 'New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cu~ 1957), 1:,13 . 
75I bid., 194. 
76As the State Department calls it. Dept. of Sta.te, Relations 
146. 
77I bid., 147. 
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superv.i.sion in August of 1945. After a Government request in 
early Barch for some move toward w.i. thdrawal, the Soviets agreed 
to a progressive evacuation, beginning on April 6 and ending on 
April 29. ?tJ Consequent Nationalis t takeover, however, was handi-
capped by extension of their lines of communication arrl lack of 
sufficient rolling stock. Governi·nent forces were further impeded 
by Russian refusal to allow the port of Dairen to be used as a means 
of entry and in continued and staggered hesitancy in Russian ·with-
drawal. Unit-scale fighting soon broke out in numerous areas of 
Manchuria, as no effective Rlcecutive eadqua.rters could be established 
t here; and as the Nationalists tried to gain control of the lines 
of corrnminication, hostilities spread southward. 79 .American forces, 
furthennore, became involved in t he fighting; and on Harch 25, 
United States authorities reported two marines ld.lled by Communist 
forces in Jehol. BO On April 6, General Gillem, Ma rshall's deputy, 
reported that Government authorities were detaining Cormnunis t cease-
fire team members at 1-h.ikden and had arrested others in Peiping. 
Chinese Air Force planes had also 11 buzzed11 the Communist center 
of Yenan.81 
78u. s., Far Eastern Series \.°Washington: Uni ted States Govern-
ment Printing office, l94B), XII, 78. 
79Dept. of State, Relations ~, 148. 
8011u s. Marines Killed by Reds, 11 The New York T:i.llles, March 26, 
1946, Sec: l.3, 4. - - - -
81Truman, Memoirs, II, 79. 
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But in Manchuria, the pd:.cture became increasingly bright 
for t he Communists. On April 15, 1946, the day after Russian 
troops had withdrawn from Changchun, the Communist forces, in 
what amounted to a "flagrant violation" of the J anuary cease-fire, 
attacked the city and by April 18 had occupied it.82 This tor e 
a breach in the negot i ations which was never mended. It at once 
made the Conmrunist generals overconfident and less agreeable to 
compromise and strengthened the ultra-reactionary groups in the 
Kuomintang. .And Harshall returned from Washington to find himself 
powerless in the chasm between two determined foes. 
1¼• Marshall returns~~ only solicit Kuomintang support 
for his mediation: the United States becomes involved in the 
Ifolatization to the extent~ its mediating~~ only-
rmi'Ici-£o the Nationalist Government. - - - ------- -----
Marshall returned t o China on April 18, 1946, to find the 
situation in this impasse . SJ Tne nly hope for respite, it appeared, 
was in the Communists I repeatedly-e::;."Pressed willingness to submit 
military and political reorganization to negotiations if the fight-
ing were terminated. The National Goverrm1ent, however, declined such 
compromises, insisting on its right to complete sovereignty over 
Na.nclruria. Since this was also a basic principle of ..American policy, 
~i.arsha.ll could only repair to Nationalist headquarters at Nan.t::ing--
which seemed the more truculent at the moment--to try to induce 
acceptance of some compromise measure. This off ended the Comrmmists 
82nept. of State, Relations ~, 149 • 
83Toid. 
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who felt that Marshall should have contacted. Chou m -lai first, 
or at least, should have arranged. for a simultaneous meeting with 
the leaders of both factions. 84 'lhe seriousness of the turmoil, 
moreover, was reflected in the fact t hat it had already meant the 
indefinite postponement of the May 5 const itutional assembly--
something 1.firi.ch the Communists, in view of their portended inferior 
position there, no doubt wanted--and had heightened factiousness 
and nnrliual distrust to the e::i...r-tent that it appeared that the Cons tit-
u tion ~which ,;-ra.s ultimately promulgated on November 12) was foredoomed 
to rejection by the Corrnm.m.ists and their allies.85 
Marshall now, in cogniza.11ce of the w"ldeniably imperious hold 
of the Gorm:rrunists in Manchuria, and in accordance with the .American 
policy of ensuring military peace before political settlement, momen-
tarily retreated from the position implied by t he Janua.r'J 10 cease-f ire 
order--tbat Manchuria was the sol property of Nationalist China--
and recommended the entry of Executive Headquarters teams into Man-
churia. This was first obstructed by the Nationalist Commander in 
Y.ianchuria, then by-~the Nationalist members of the teams themselves 
-who would claim no authority for themselves in the embattled a.rea. 86 
8411 Reds Irked at Marshall's Delay in Meeting Chou, 11 
~, April 21, 1946, Sec. 26, 3. 
85As it finally was. See p. 83 of -this paper. 
86rn spite of this a few teams were active in Manchuria as early 
as April 8. F. R., 417. 
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1'1a.rshall began to abide by the Nationalists• decisions, instead 
of the Nationalists abiding by his. 
As the Communists realized that Marshall could not prevent 
Chiang from having his way, their propaganda attacks began to 
single out the American mediator for criticism. The Nationalists 
parried thi s with their own criticisms of Marshall and of the United 
States; a.'11.d both factions tried to present the face of readiness to 
compromise to the general public while both, in fact, began to cling 
the more tenaciously to extremist positions. Chiang, for instance, 
while announcing his intent to capture Changchun, and while resisting 
Marshall; s efforts to woo him away .from t his revanchist position, 
was simultaneously agreeing to get rid of t he rightists in the Kuo-
mintang.87 As a feint in this direction, he announced his intention, 
on April 29 , 1946, to relieve the extreme right-·w:i..ng militarist, 
General Yeng-chin, of his command. Somewhat anomalously, it had 
been Yeng-chin is statements on Manchuria, asserting that it uas a 
problem which could be solved by force alone, which had presaged 
Chiang's ovm. 83 Yeng-chin was subsequently offered the position of 
8711 Kuomintang .Agrees to Get Rid of Rightists,u ~' 
1''Iarch 17, 1946, Sec. 29, 1, 3. 
88Ernest Klein, Sovietized China \,New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Com.uany, 19.51), 57. General Yeng-chin is reported as saying as early 
as October, 194.5, llThere is no chance f or agreement in China. The 
Chinese Cormnunist movement represents a foul excrescence of the Chin-
ese Nationalist revolution which must be done aHay with by force. 11 
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Chief of Staff to get him out of field command. Yeng-chin, 
however, declined the offer and announced his r etirement on Hay 
l3, 1946, serving as a badly-needed "l·lhipping boy for a policy 
that was clearly in the ascendant.89 
2• breach widens: f actions express distrust of the 
United States, Ma..rshall 11despitefully used11 .!::Z the 
Kuomintang. 
The Communists were now becoming stronger in their charges 
that the Marshall Mission was merely a Nationalist-American intrigue 
against them.90 The Nationalists disclaimed this, citing the betrayal 
at Yalta as t he prime manifestation of .American non-partiality toward 
Nationalist China..9lrhroughout April and May, the exchange of propagan-
da took place 1-tlth such frequency and increasing acrimony that by 
May 30, Marshall 1--ias reduced to a meek explanation in a press confer-
ence of .America's role in China. Singularly u.ninventive, :Marshall 
echoed the old line which had come to be regarded by the Communists 
as mere cant: that the United States was not interested in f orcing 
its will upon China, but rather wished only to promote concord in 
accordance with t he desire for peace that the t wo factions had expressed 
in the agreement of November, 1945.92 Recalcitrance continued to grow. 
8911 Yeng-chin Will Retire, 11 ~, Hay 14, 1946, 
Sec. l, 3. 
90nc0 mmunists Fear China-U .s. Ties, 11 ~-, May 22, 1946, Sec 10, 
3, 6. 
9lwedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, 351. 
9211:r,farsball Explains U. s. Role, 11 Y('.)rk ~, Hay 31, 
1946, Sec. 1, J. 
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Nationalist China increased its agitation for control of Man-
churia. The Communists demanded a revision of the military reorg-
anization plan so that they might have five divisions in Manchu_ria 
to the Nationalists 1 fourteen, instead of the one division as 
planned. 
This war hysteria had the ef fect of forcing t he desk §ener-
al out of action. Reminding the National Government that it would 
be a violation of the truce to attack Changchun, Marshall withdrew 
as mediator, though he continued to hold s eparate conferences with 
representatives of both sides and carry communications between the 
two sides. Marshall also p roposed a 11 compromise11 looking to the 
gratification of Kuomintang desires, but by a gradual and peaceful, 
instead of an ii"llmediate and warlike, process. This plan suggested 
Communist lvlthdrai-ral from Changchun, t he establishment of an Executive 
Headquarters there, and complete Nationalist occupation of the city 
at the end of a six- month interval. The Communists naturally ob jected 
to this plan, saying t hat the giving up of Changchun would also put 
in doubt t he status of other Manchurian cities, such as Kirin and 
Harbin, upon which t he Nationalists had further designs. Chou also 
repeated at this time the Communist demand for five divisions in 
Manchuria.93 
Marshall's actions at this juncture are gr aphically demonstrat-
ive of the 11nonpolitical, neutrain policy ·which he was forced to 
follow in the a bsence of any nti.litar<J, economic, or moral suasion. 
93Dept. of State, Relations~~' 152-154. 
Tl 
In this instance, as Kuomintang militarism gathered steam, 
Marshall is diplomacy was forced to attach itself to that faction 
which had the more momentum, as the content of the 11 compror.use11 
suggestion indicates. Furthermore, when the Communists had taken 
Changchun, even the new mediation could only request Chiang to 
exercise control over his party• s revanchist emotions. But 
once influence and emotion have combined within the Kuomintang 
to ma.ke t he drive on Changchun somewhat of an inevitability, Mar-
shall can only devise a plan wuich would provide for eventual Nat-
ionalist accession to the city, but by peaceful means. 
Chiang lmew that behind this rather shallow kind of entreating 
diplomacy there lay no sanction that a bit of deviousness could not 
evade. Consequently, on May 22, when Harshall felt that he was coming 
close to arriving at a basis for agreement on Changchun, Chiang not-
ified the mediator that he had not heard from his troops for three 
days, and so, with assurances of peaceful intent, he left on }fuy 23 
for Mukden. En route to Ifukden, however, he transmitted to Harshall 
three demands which f or the time being disrupted any chance .for agree-
ment on t he Manchurian crisis. Seemingly possessed of a premonition 
of his annies' successes in the field, Chiang demanded: 1) that the 
Communists facilitate the re-establishment of communications in north 
China and Manchuria, 2) that they make immediate plans for military 
demobilization and reorganization, and 3) that on all field tea.i"lls or 
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high staff teams, the American member be allowed the deciding 
vote.94 With this set of demands, Chiang at once aroused Communist 
suppicion against the United States with an all-too-obvious trust 
in the American voting r ecord, arrl. put the entire American mission 
at his mercy. Marshall could no longer find great trust with the 
Communists, and, without that lever, he could no longer have any 
assurance that Chiang would in any way heed his advice. In a word, 
Chiang had despitefully used Marshall. 
Nor was this all. On May 23, as Changchun fell to the 
Nationalists, Chiang was, by some happy coincidence, there to enjoy 
the triumph. His forces thence flared out to make menacing motions 
in the direction of Harbin and Kirin; and Chiang, quick to real ize 
that he had Marshall in his grip, fired a message to him asking for 
his 11 gu.arantee 11 that the Communists would carry out the three dema.nds.9.5 
To Harshall I s reply that t hese actions were mald.ng it difficult for 
him to continue as mediator; Chiang confidently answered that he 
was cognizant of that fact and re-avowed his peaceful intent, t hough 
only backing it with the evidence that he was now in f avor of having 
Executive Headquarters teams in :Manchuria . But this was r ather weak 
evidence in view of the trammels which the Nat ionalists had previously 
94rbid., 154-155. 
95Which, as Chiang explained, would consist in General Harshall 1 s 
setting time limits for the putting into effect of all agreements 
which General Marshall had signed and in his assuming responsibi lity 
for supervision over t he strict observance of agreements by the 
Communists. 1)7 • 
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imposed on the Headquarters teams. 
Chiang returned to Na.nk:i.ng on June 3, issued orders for 
the establishment of Executive Headquarters teams in Manchuria, 
and halted the advance. By June 6, a 15-day truce had been 
agreed upon.96 But t he courtly attitude of Chiang toward American 
mediating personnel had wrought its ends. Communist propaganda 
reached a shrill crescendo in anti-Americanism. On the same day 
tbat t he truce was agreed upon, the Comnnmist pr ess attacked the 
continued presence of American t roops in China and asserted t hat 
Marshall's peace efforts were futile unless the United States with-
drew its fo rces. The following day, Comrade Hao expressed the 
traditional Communist tautology, strikingly international in style 
and scope, t hat the Communis ts wanted peace while the United States 
had always been, was now, and ever would be, an imperialist power. 
The Yenan press on June 8 charged that Japanese troops were being 
utilized by the Nationalists and by the United States to f ight Comm-
urust troops.97 
But Marshall had not been intent i onal l y partial, and these 
attacks now aroused him to the dipl omatic error of openly taking 
9~ enry Wei, China and Soviet Russia \Princeton: D. Van Nos-
trand Company, 19~l'I'ff • 
97"Comnru.nists See Marshall 's Peace Eff orts Useless Unless U • S. 
Withdraws Forces, 11 as quoted from the Yanan Iinancipati on Daily in~ 
New York Times, June 7, 1946, Sec. 8, ~ orranunists Want Peace, U.Se 
Imperialistic , " ibid., June 8, 1946, Sec. 9, 3; 11 Japanese Used to 
Fight Reds, 11 ibid., June 9, 1946, Sec. 2.5 , 2. 
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sides against one of the factions. One June 13, as acerbity grew 
and Marshall found hi.rnself helpless in the face of rapidly-moving 
field developments, he comrn.itted the irreparable faux pas of pub-
licly accusing the Communists of blocking the truce~tj Arr:1ed now 
with -what seemed the virtual certitude of impunity, the reaction-
ary fervor shot towa rtl its pini.-iacle within the Kuomintang. Ch June 
17, Chiang presented demands which, if answered, would have ipso 
given him complete control of all north China and Manchuria.99 
Anti-American demonstrat ions of a rightist t inge were carried on 
in Nanking and Shanghai; and quite significantly, even as the 
Ifuomintang uas vehemently denying t he rightist tag, General Yeng-
chin was placed back in his command on June 29. 'Ihe Shanghai Nat-
ionalis t press now began t o call for all-out war against the Commun-
i sts.100 
In the face of this dual extremism, :Marshall undertook to 
931111.arshall Char ges Chou with Blocking Truce, 11 
~, June 14, 1946, Sec. 2, 2 . 
99The plan dem..,.mded Comnrunis t withdrawal from Jehol, Chahar, 
Shantung localities occupi ed after noon on June 7, and from Harbin, 
ntung, Tunghwa, Huta.rudang, and Paicheng in Manchuria. Dept. of 
State, Rel ations ~. 
lOOuyeng-cbin Again in Comr.-;and; Shanghai Press Wants War , gainst 
the Comnrunists, 11 The New York Times, June 30, 1946, Sec• 15, 1. -----
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present his draft agreement on the army reorganization plan. 
It maintained the 5 to 1 ratio in troops, but provided for six 
months instead of the previous twelve for assignment of troops to 
specific areas. The l:'1leecuti ve Headquarters ·uas to determine areas 
of occupat ion, a.~d the Government garrison in Har bin was explicitcy 
restricted to 5,000 troops. Government troops , moreover, were not 
immediat,ely to move into the areas which the Communists had evacuated 
in China proper, and local governrnents and a Peace Preservation Corps 
were to oversee this. Chiang promptly dissented from the restrictions 
placed on the Goverrunent garrison in arb:i.n and the stricture against 
the quick moving of Government troops into north China. Chou ;!:lai, 
on t he other hand, objected to t he proposed Communist withdrawal 
from Kiangsu.101 
'fhe truce was renewed on July 1, but it had little chance in 
the f ace of increased Nationalist agitation for all-out action and 
heightened Cormnunist obsession -with the pr esence of American troops. 
The situation so nearcy approached cataclysm t hat Truman records that 
now, "For the first time, Marshall sounded a discouraging note. 11 102 
Say:i...11.g in a cable to Truman t h.at success now depended more upon 
happenings in t he field than on the "problems of negotiation, 11 Harshall 
appended a rather dire note: 11 I am working against time. 11 
lOlDept. of State, Rel ations ~, 166. 
102Trurnan, Memoirs, II, 79. 
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Disagreement at this time became indeed so violent that 
it began to permeate the United States itself and produce its oi-m 
antipodes there. Groups led by such spokesmen as the Narine Corps 
Commandant, General A. A. Vandegriff were urging that the marines 
r emain in China 11as long as United States policy demands it; 11103 
while the New York Committee to ·win the Peace and Brigadier General 
E. F. Carlson were urging rapid withdrawal, together with some 
recognition of the f act that the Chinese Communists -were beginning 
to eJq?ress the wi shes of more t ha...l'l a slim minority of the Chinese 
populace.104rn all quarters throughout the world, chauvinism was 
sharpening . Moscow radio began to compare t he Kuomintang with the 
German National Socialist Party of 1933, and indeed cited direct Nazi 
influence as a holdover from the early German military advisorship 
to the Kuomintang. 
Increased field activity was the natural outcome . The Honan-
Hupeh area soon became again a hotbed of innumerable small conflicts;105 
l03 11vandegriff Says Narines to Stay in China, 11 ~, 
July 3, 1946, Sec. 3, 7. 
104nBrigadi er General E. F. Carlson Supports Hme . Sun ' s Position 
and Right to Speak for People, 12 ~•, July 25, 1946, Sec. 4, 2. 
10511Nazi Influence in Kuomintang," i bid., Ju.ne 28 , 1946, Sec. 12, 5; 
t1Honan and Hupeh Activity,"~-, July7:'f; 1946, Sec. 1, 2. 
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and Communist forces began to mass near Peiping and Tientsin after 
a preliminary assault on Ll.ncheng. On July 29, there occurred an 
ambush of American marines by Communist fore es in which t hree marines 
we_re killed and t welve wounded. Seven marines were also kidnapped 
in East Hopei by the Communists and. held under duress for several 
days before their release.lo6 
Chiang Kai-shek, meanwhile, departed. Nanking on July 14 for 
Kuling, seriously handicapping negotiations. Marshall's hands had 
always been tied by the popular vogues which were prevalent in the 
United States, but never so noticeably as now, i·men violent opinion 
swept all the way to the shores of the Potomac. Truman, in his ~-
~, notes a good example of the 1.-;ay in which violently formed public 
opinion can paralyze the efforts of the individual diplomat: 
At this point Ma r shall was seriously handicapped by various 
proposals that had been introdu ced in the Congress and appear-
ed related for passage--propo a.ls that would have extended 
Lend-lease and other aid to the government of Chiang Kai-shek 
without laying dovm a. condition tha t he work with General Mar-
shall. This was heart-breaking and contributed greatly to 
General 0larshal1 1 s troubles ••• As was to happen again and 
again in later years, the Chinese govern.rnent sought to gain 
advantages from our govenunent cry applying pressures from 
other directions ••• the •die-ha.ros 1 in China gained new 
confidence and sabotaged :Marshall• s efforts to bring a.bout 
peace.107 
lo6 Dept. of State, Relations~~, 172. 
107 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 80. 
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5. 'lhe appointment of John Leighton Stuart as .Ambassador: 
meaiatTori is reduced toanaiysis a.n:1 introductTon of artifices. -- - ----- - ------ - -----
John Leighton Stuart, meanwhile, was appointed United States 
Ambassador to China, upon the recommendation of General Harshall , on 
lOtl July 16, 1946. Dr. Stuart was an educator and a missionary who had 
been acting as President of Yenching University in Peiping prior to his 
appointment as .Ar.lbassador. His idea of the cure for China I s ills 't-JaS 
to educate the Chinese to adjust themselves to China's new, "modern 
109 international environment. 11 - Bu.t at the time of his appointment, 
propensities seem to have traveled. quite far in the other direction. 
Stuart and 1'1.~rshall, as a result, were reduced to ·wasting away at 
the rather artificial tasks of reporting to China that its economic 
situation was deteriorating and of inst ituting the 5-man council, in 
most ways a needless repitition of the old 3-man co:mr.ri.ttees. 
At this point, there was no middle ground left. In a press 
conference held on August 3, 1946, Chu Teh and two other Gomrrru.nist 
Generals saw a resumption of full-scale, all-out civil war as inevit-
able~O In the United States, meammile, Senators Ellender and :Butler 
were calling for the withdraual of the United States mission in Chma, 
stating that the situation was by now a 11hopeless imbrogllo, 11 and 
Senator Owen Brewster was recormnending that, while peace negotiations 
should probably be discontinued, American marines should nevertheless 
hold t heir ground in China as the guardians of the festern world against 
lObStuart, Fifty~' 166. 
109roid., lts3 • 
llOnfuree Communist Generals See Civil War Inevitable, 11 
York Times, August 4, 1946, Sec. 1, 4. --
possible fussian incursion.lll 
The joint statement issued by Stuart and Harshall on 
August 10, 1946, -was itself anything but opt:i.mistic in import. 
It cited the det,eriorating economic situation and continued strife 
in the face of what Stuart, Marshall, and other American observors 
had often t ermed the unanimous desire for peace and prosperity. 
The character of the dispute, as this statement pcbinted out, now 
began to center its focus on the character of local governments after 
troop reassignment and displacement. The Communists, looking to a 
withdrawal from north China wluch was imm:i.m.ent if agreement were to 
be reached at the negotiating table, demanded insurance that local 
civil administrations would be l eft inviolate when the Nationalist 
military forces entered. Chiang, on t he otl:B r hand, had often 
repeated t he opinion that Kuomintang f orces could not i: surrend.er 
administrative responsi bill t i esn in the localities and provinces 1vhich 
they occupied.112 
At this point, 11ith the Communists ostensibly demanding civil-
ian control and the Nationalists pointing toward military control, the 
argument that react ion had swept the Kuomintang was, prima ~, 
convincing to all quarters. Yet no respite was offered the Communists 
even a s a stratagem to bring the Nationalists into line. Inst ead, 
11111s enator Brewster Says f'Iarines Prevent Soviet Regime, n 
York Times, August 9, 1946, Sec. 26 , 8. --
112
nept. of State, Relations~~, 173 ff. 
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President Truman, tacitly testifying to the impotency of his 
mediating tec1.m in China, sent a direct message to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek on August 10, 1946, in which he informed the 
G_eneraliss:i.mo of his grave concern. Expressly citing that school 
of thought which blamed militant reactionary forces in China with 
suppressing liberalism both within and outside the Kuomintang, Tru-
man re-asseverated the intention of the United States to withhold 
economic aid for rehabilitating industry and agriculture until such 
t ime as the civil conflict ended. Chiang 1 s reply of August 28 seemed 
to assume the same ingenuosity on the part of the President that he 
had been free to assume on the part of Narshall, and it shifted the 
blame to the Corrmrunists in t he most obtuse manner, blaming them as 
the faction which in r eality wished to usurp civil government with 
the military. Truman remained steadfast, however, and replied on 
August 31 to repeat his warning t hat only the end of civil war would 
make feasible the extension of economic aid.ll3 
6. August, 1946: traces of complete alignments .2.f Chinese 
!actions with the United States and t he Soviet Union, respectively, 
begin to appear. -
During August of 1946, the drift toward all-out strife gathered 
a momentum that 1-as almost irrevocable; and the two polarizations in 
China showed more certain prospects of attaching themselves to the Uni-
113Ib'd -2;_·, 179-180. 
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ted States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. 
Several speakers on the floor of the United States House of 
Representatives voiced desires for firmer action agains t the 
Soviet Union. Marine-Communist clashes were repeated throughout 
the month, and on August 18, Yenan ordered mobilization of all 
Comnru.n:i.st troops. An .American intelligence report of August 30 
found that the Soviet Union had troops stationed at Chinese Comm-
unist bases.114 
Stuart, as part o:f a move to alleviate Communis t intransi-
gence through a somev-m.at strained device, organized a five-man 
committee to deal with the problems of negotiation concurrently 
,;-r.i..th the three-man conunittee. By September 3, both factions bad 
named their delegates to this committee, over which Dr. Stuart was 
to preside a s Chairman. It was Chiang, however, who attached himself 
to this committee because of its advertised American hegemony, and 
he refused to participate in any further 6ommittee of Three meetings 
until the five-man council was convened.115 
The split y,Jcl.S also reflected in the projected constituency 
of the State Council. The selections of the Generalissimo-President 
ll411House Wants Firmer Action Against u.s.s.R., 11 The~ York 
Times August 11, 1962, Sec. 17, 4; 11Narine-Comnm.nist'""c!ashes,1t i bid., 
August 11, 1946, Sec. 6, 8; 11 Yenan Ortlers Mobilization, 11 ibid., August 
19 1946, Sec. 24, 7; 11u. s. Intelligence Reports Show u.s .s.R. Has 
Tr~ops at Chinese Bases, n ~-, August 31, 1946, Sec. 4, 5. 
n 5Dept. of State, Relations~~, 175° 
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had restricted Communist and third.-party delegates to a rather 
slim minority. They, in return, da"11anded control of fourteen 
seats in the council of forty, enough for a veto. }furshall finally 
got Chiang to agree to the usual compromise--which in effect gave 
Chiang everything t hat he wanted. The Cornrrnmists and their friendly 
allies such as the Democratic League and 11no-party11 f ellow t ravelers 
like Kuo Mo-jo were t o be allowed thirteen seats i n the State 
Council--one short of a veto.116 
In prompt accordance wit h t his hiatus in agreement, the Nat-
ional Government fo rces pr es sed into Connnunist territory and began 
advancing toward t he strat egic city of Kal gan . lfarshall, believing 
t hat the attack would be unnecessarily destructive, as1-:ed to be 
relieved as mediator. Chiang, in reply, agreed t o a truce, while 
the Communists demanded complete cessation of attack. lfarshall warn-
ed Chiang that further advances orthward at t his point might well 
cause the Soviet Union to extend direct assistance to the Chinese 
Communists. The admonition was lost on Chiang, however , who i·Ja.S 
bent on unifying China, and thus preparing it for .American aid, in 
his own 1.ray. 'ti-Jhen the Comnru.nists at lengt h officially rejected the 
truce, requesting that there be no t ime limit to it and that troops 
move back t o t he posi tions they held in China proper as of January 13 
and in Manchuria as of June 7, Chiang unleashed the full onslaught 
of his attack. On October 10, 1946, both Ka.lga.n and Chihfeng, the 
ll6stuart, Fifty Years, 170. --
last CoitU11U.nist stronghold in Jehol Province, fell, as did towns 
formerly held by the Comrm.1.nists in northern Kiangsu.117 
1• breach complete: American mediation 
wrecked~ the~ of Kalgan. 
11>lith this Nationalis t triumph, negotiations, even though 
VJarshall lingered on in China until his recall on January 6, 1947, 
were adJni.nistered the actual coup grace. All through the month 
of September, both sides and the powers which were emerging as their 
sponsors--the United States and the Soviet Union--e:rJ:iibited an ever-
heightening adamancy. A resolution of the United States House of 
Representatives on September 5 again urged a stiffer policy against 
Communism in China. On September 6, Moscow radio announced that 
withdrawal of .American troops afforded the only possible prospect for 
agreement. Henry A. Wall ace, formerly Vice-President of the United 
States and Secretary of Conm1erce, made a speech in Boston on Septem-
ber 12, pleading for retention of international feeling over the China 
crisis, c1.nd was heckled by an unruly mob of Russophobes; Chou ili-lai, 
on September 8, in pleading for a reconvening of the military commiss-
ion in the face of the imminent beleaguennent of Y-.a.J.gan, denied any 
connections with the Soviet Union. Marshall, nevertheless, rejected 
the plea. on September 13, apparently giving up any hope that .American 
mediation could restore permanent peace or even a temporary t ruce.ll8 
l18 11uouse Urges Stiffer Policy, 11 ~, September 6, 
1946, Sec . 9, 3; 11 Walla.ce Heckled, 11 ~-, September D, 19h6, Sec . 1, 
l· 11c11ou Denies Ties with U.S . S.R., 11 i bid., September 9, 1946, Sec . 6, s; "Marshall Rejects Red Ple~ to Reconvene 1'1ilita!"J Committee, 11 ~•, 
September 14, 1946, Sec . 2, 6. 
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Consequently, on September 20, the Communists threatened to 
publish the proceedings of the peace parleys unless the Harshall 
military committee was reconYened. 
By September 30, certain small progressiv-e groups in the 
United States were getting on the bandwagon for i,rl.thdrawal of Amer-
ican troops, and the Russian United Nations representative, K. V. 
K:i..sselev-, on October 2, claimed tbat the presence of United States 
troops in China constituted a violation of the United Nations Chart-
er.119 
With the fall of Kalgan, finally, hard and fast lines were 
unremittingly drawn. As Dr. Stuart recalls the event: 
By a coincidence this was almost exactly one month before 
the opening of the National Assembly and it was required 
that a f ormal summons to all delegates should be i s sued 
one month in advance . The emotional reaction of the highly 
emotional Chou En-lai and of his companions was the more 
intense because t hese t wo ev ts were thus synchronized..120 
As this crucial series of events is related by Dr. Sun Fo, 
Chou was still planning to go to Nanldng to continue negot iations even 
after the fall of Kalgan. Stuart records that Marshall at this point 
11911communists Threaten to Publish Peace Parleys Unless Marshall 
1,J.iJitary Committee Convened, 11 ibid., September 21, 19l~6, Sec. 6, 4; 
nu. s. Ll.beral Groups Urge u. s:-Troop .•Jithdrawal, 11 ibid., September 
30, 1946, Sec . 14, 2; 11 Presence of U. s. Troops Charge'crViolation of 
U. N. Charter, 11 ~-, October 2, 1946, Sec. 8, 1. 
120stuart, Fifty~, 170. 
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"went to the extreme 11 of ny1.ng to Shanghai to urge Chou to 
return to Nanking •121 But when the October 11 mandate an.riouncing 
the convocation of the National .Assembly arr-lved., Chou abruptly 
changed his plans. The t hi rd parties also denounced this convo-
cation as unilatera l and dictatory on t he part of the Kuomintang . 
Veiling the opening a t tacks on Antung and Chef oo, Chiang on 
October 16 issued a stat ement of basis f or negotiations which ha.rk-
ened back t o a j oint statement by St uart and Har shall made on 
Sept ember 27, which called for: l } simultaneou s meetings of the 
Connnittee of Three and t he five-man council, 2) cont inued negotiat-
ions on military demobilization and reorganization, and 3 ) resolut ion 
of questions of local government by the Kuomintang-dominated State 
Council. To this Chiang appended a p roposal positing t he exclusion 
of Manchuria f rom the proposal providing for the settlement of t he 
que stion of local government by the State Council.122 The September 
27th proposals were in t hemselves overwhelming enough, the Communists 
felt, without Chiang' s addition and t he continued Nationalist off ensive. 
Chou En-lai, toget her with t he t hird pa r t,y group, returned. to Nanki..ng 
to discuss the proposal, but on October 24, Chou informed .Ambas sador 
Stuart that he could not accept it.123 
Government forces, meanwhile, occupied t he last stations on 
L2libid. 
122.oept. of State, Relations~~, 197 .. 
123Ibid., 198-199. 
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on the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway and moved along the Peiping-Hankow 
Railway in southern Hopei. The Com.rnunists withdrew their personnel 
from the Executive Headquarters and from all field teams in the 
Government-occupied areas with the result that practically all 
branches were inoperative.124 
Tf.ith all other vistas having been eyJlausted by the now-imper-
vious intransigence of the two major Chinese factions, Marshall and 
Stuart, as a last desperate measure, suggested mediation by a Third 
Party Group which included the liberal parties and the p'Outh l eagues . 
On Novem.ber 1, this group recommended informal conferences be held. 
Chiang Kai-shek agreed, but now holding milit ary supremacy, he insisted 
that his proposal of October 16 constitute the agenda. Chou En-lai 
reluctantly agreed, and the meeting was set for November 4. Before 
the conference convened, the Nationalists were insistent that no 
cessation of hostilities could e effected until the Communists sub-
mitted a list of their delegates to the National Assembly. Confused 
by this intrusion of political matter into what purported to be an 
attempt at military settlement, the Third Party Group turned to 
Marshall and Stuart; but the latter declined to take the lead in 
negot iat,ions, saying that a Chinese neutral group should act in 
mediation, !:!: political questionst25 
The Conference never materialized, however, as on November 




t he Communist case . ationalist del egates, now playing the 
United St ates for all that it was worth, suddenly refused to attend 
on the gr ounds that the Con:nmm:l.sts had refused American mediation .126 
Chiang, however, still professed to Marshall and Stuart 
t hat he favored a cessation of hostilities . To thi s end, he pre-
pared a statement on November 8 which t he two . merican mediators 
found equivocal in tone and diff icult to understand . To the queries 
of larshall and Stuart following their pe rusal of the document, Chiang 
replied that in preparing the draft he had had to t alce into consider-
ation that, while there had formerly been a divided opinion in the 
Government regarding the proper course to be f ollowed, there was now 
a complete unanimity of opinion i n the Government t hat a policy of 
force was the only course to f ollow. 127 
A cease- fire followed, but it was unilaterally undertaken by 
the Generalissimo for t he pu ose of convoking the National Assembly, 
also by unilateral fiat, during the interregnum of peace. 1W The 
Communists, hence, as well as a consider able porti on of the liberal 
delegates, did not take part in t he adoption of the constitut ion. 
This consti tu ti.on delivered on paper everything which t he Kuomintang 
had protestingly promised to the United States and to their rival 
factions in China. Marshall was to write in his final statement o.f 
126 ! · ~-, 449 . 
127 
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January 'l, 1947: 
It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit 
to participate in the Assembly, since the constitution 
that has been adopted seems to include every maj or point 
that they wanted.129 
As regar ds the establishment of instituti ons that were demo-
cratic in form, the statement is irrefutably correct: the basis 
of government was broadened with a State Council in which the 
Communists, the Democratic Socialists, the Young China Party, and 
the independents were to hold seats along wi t h member s of the Kuo-
mintang. The political program of the National Government of China 
called for 11political democratization11 and "nationali zation of the 
armed forces.n The Executive Yuan was to execute the vri.11 of the 
State Council, thus conforming t o the principle of "authority and 
re si__:i onsibility. 11 Provinces were to separate military and civil 
authority, and all parties ere to be allowed to participate in 
provincial government . And "strict guarantees 11 were to be accorded 
t o 11 the people I s freedom of person, freedom of speech, f reedom of 
publication, and freedom of assembly. 11 130 
literally, the new constitution was thus sufficiently broad 
and democratic. In like manner, Chiang's speech to the closing sess-
ion of the P. C. c. on Jamtary 31, 1946, had carried a message of 
honest intent to reform. 11 1 wish to declare first on behalf of the 
Government, 11 he intoned: 
129congressional Reco1-tl, 80 Cong., 1 ~., XLIII, 368. 
130 Dept. of State, Relations~~, 740. 
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t hat they [ the P. C. C. resolution~ will be ful ly r es-
pected and carried out as soon as t he prescribed. procedur es 
have been completed. I pledge at t he same! t i.me that I vr.i..ll 
uphold this pr ogram faith.fully and will also see t o it that 
all the military and civil subordinates follow it strict l y . 
From now on, I .-r.i..11 , whet her in t he Gover nment or out of i t 
fai th.fully and resol utely observei as a citizen shoul d, a11' 
the decisions of this Confer ence . 31 
Chiang, however, could make the promise r at her glibl y, since he 
never i ntended to be out of the Government . The coll ected wartime 
speeches of t he Generalissimo are r ife wi th an imperious t one of his 
mm personal leadership_; and in China 1s 11lfarch 'f owards Democracy, 11 
i t was t he Kuomintang under Chiang I s ment or ship which was scheduled 
to "bring the shi p safel y t o port . 1~132 r1or eover , i n spite of the 
fac t t hat , as Lawrence K. P..osinger and other s had noted in 1944, 
Chiang I s mill tarism actually amounted to an :i.mposi t ion of warlord 
power upon t he van~ ard. of t he nationalist movement, Chi ang was vir-
tually a s sured of .American pporG.133 American medi at i on certainl y 
did I!D.lCh to corroborat e thi s beli ef . The const i t ution of 1946, praised 
by both Chiang and .Marshall, negated in essence its democratic f orm 
by a ssuring a. sea.ting ar rangement wher eby t he minor:i:t,y parties and 
t he Communist s would have no chance of over riding Pr esi dential veto , 
and a. ver y sl im one of overriding the Kuomintang majority. American 
diplomacy, inaSITU1ch as it repeatedly found itself an one si de of the 
f ence duri ng the China crisis of 1946, had the f inal eff ect of accent-
uating, rather t han mit i gat ing., the polar dualisms that were emerging 
131Ibid • ., )Ji3 . 
132chiang, Kai- shek, The Collected ·wartime Speeches of Generalissimo 
Chia$~-~, 1937-194TTNew York: John Day Co., 194o"J, I, 205. 
1331a.wrence K. Rosinger, China. 1 s Wartime Politics, ,illl-1944 (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1944), vii. 
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with such vertical force in China. 
:t-Jarshall remained in China throughout December of 1946, 
only to be appalled by the Communists• repeated r e jections of his 
overtures and their repeated refusals to join in the constitutional 
government . Finally, saying that he would neither be used by either 
side nor serve as an umpire on the battlefield, Marshall e:xpressed 
his opinion that all avenues had been exhaust ed .134 Consequently, 
he was recalled by the President on January 6, 194 7, and departed 
China on January 8 .13 5 
Chiang Kai-shek continued on his sortie into Comnmnist terr-
itory, enjoying great success for a time and even capturing Yenan 
in February of 1947. But, in the ·words of Dean G. Acheson, the 
111a1lnost inexhaustible patienceH of the Chinese people in their misery 
ended; the nationalist fervor umoved out from under" Chiang, and 
in large part defected to the foe. 136The United States Chamber of 
Cormnerce estimated in Yiarch of 19h9 that there had been a twenty or 
more fold increase from 1946 through 1949 in tlie Communist forces 
by 1"Jcl.Y of 11 voluntary turnover of Nationalist troops . "137 The Nation-
alist Government lost its backi ng, became ineffectual and decadent, 
134nept,. of State, Relations~~, 217. 
l3.5Ibid. 
136F. R., 112-113 - -
13 7 As quoted in W'illiam A. Williams (ed.~, The Shaping of American 
Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand Mc Nally and Company, ""'!956), ll~ 
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and so fell. Rather wistfully, :triarshall stated on January 7, 
1947, that: 
The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conf-
erence a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking char-
ter -which then offered China a basis for peace and recon-
struction. However, irreconcilable gr oups within the 
Kuomintang, interested. i n the preservation of their o~m 
feudal control of China,. evidently had no real int ention 
of implementing t hem.Do 
JJ8congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 ~•, XLI, 368 . 
CHAPTER V 
CONCIBSIONS 
A. '.!he Debate over China Policy ------·-----
After the unsuccessful termination of the Marshall Mission, 
and particularly since the takeover of the Chines e ma.inland by the 
Connnunists and their subsequent academic, political, and ideological 
vituperation of the United States, Western writers have been forced 
into a hartl line a gainst Oriental Communism, and have been wont to 
put the brunt of r esponsibility f or the disruption of the negotiations 
upon the Communist faction.l Indeed, the idea that 11you ca.nit deal 
with the Co1Tu."11U.Dists 11 had been an article in the creed for a period 
for some time antedating the mission itself. Implementation of the 
coalition government which the United States proposed, however, loaded 
the Communists with the responsibility of assuming an inferior posture 
under Nationalis t leadership. It was true that a s both Chiang and 
Harshall p r essed the Communists to t hus make possible the institution 
of the new nonpolitical army and t he State Council \by accepting a 
minority 147. both), the Nationalist forces and areas were decidedly in 
the plurality; a.'1d further, the Kuomintang was showing forth its might, 
pressing forward on a drive which fell ed the major strongholds of 
Commurti.sm. 
But the situation was less unequal t han either the milita....'jf' 
situation or the proposed I-fuomintang-heavy government would have 
1:rriarshall is usually incrirnina ted only a s the inadvertent aider 
of the Communist cause. 
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indicated. The Comr:i:unists were still in control of mos t of the 
crucial area of Manchuria; and, as General Chou Ro.-lai had 
asserted in October of 1946, while they had lost cities, they had 
not lost armies, and were determined t,o fight to t he finish. 2 
Furthermore, Marshall seei11ed to i gnore in his dealing in 
political ai'fairs the warning he had given to Chiang in relation 
to military aff airs-- t hat the proposed drive into Manchuria might 
well give the Russians excuse to tender aid and support to t.he 
Chinese Communists, and that, furthermore, the operation i-ra.s ultim-
ately impossible in the face 0£ t he consolidated opposition which 
the Comrrru.nist faction could, in t he last analysis, off er. Similar-
ly, the Chinese Co:rmnuni sts a ssuredly had enough in area and polit ical 
control to sabotage t he proposed new govern.ment in its operat i on; 
and t hus t heir demand for a veto--a scant veto, at t.hat-- in the 
new State Council may not have been wi t hout its justifi cation in the 
actual sit uation. 
But the empirics seem to have been i gnored in f avor of careful 
notations on ideology. Vigorous anti-ComrtlU.Ilists could point to 
the many speeches of Chiang Ka.i-shek and maintain that he at least 
aired his int entions for the ultimate broadening of the governi~ent 
and the extension of democratic suffrage to the Chinese people.3 
2u. s. Department of State, United States Rel ations with China, 
with Special Reference Period 194.4-1949 ~1iashington:U .S:-
Qovernment Printing Office, 1947), 202. 
3As see Lawrence K. Rosinger, Chinais Wartime Politics lPrince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 195. ChiaP..g repeatedly went 
on record as favoring government "of the people, by t he people, for the 
people. 11 
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The dialectic of the Kuomintang i tsel.f, while just as rigid as 
that of the Chinese Communist Party, called for the eventual 
doing away with the stage of 11political tutelage, u seemingly the 
iron rule and lack of ruth which the Generalissimo was currently 
evincing, a~d its replacement with democratic government.4 On 
the other hand, the Communist dialectic was p recisely the reverse, 
p referring to go through a stage of 11 bourgeois 11 democracy only as 
a prelude to that type of total party rule which t he Comr.mnists 
have long called by the name of 11 economic democracy. 11 
Yet the pattern which was in evidence throughout the duration 
of the ¥.1arshall Mission fooled many. The right Kuomintang f ound 
itself in influential positions, dict ated a policy which meant a 
subversion of democratic processes, and arrogated the little financ-
ial support which China received to the interested.5 A repressive 
poLi.cy in the provinces, moreover, alienated popular support. On the 
other hand, as we have noted, such American correspondents as Gunther 
Stein, while convinced that the Kuomintang was really vilifying the 
4wen and KI.ea.nor Lattimore, Making of Mcxiern ~, ! 
History \New York: W. f. Norton and Company, !'949), 152. 11 The Chin- · 
ese one-party system is preparatory to a future democratic government. 
In this fact it differs from fascist one-party systems, much are i deo-
logically anti-democratic." 
)John Leighton Stuart, Fii't,y Years~ China, The Memoirs of~ 
Leighton Stuart, Plissionary and Ambassador \New YorF Random House 
Publishers, 1954), 164. The"ITc-c clique,n or the Chen brothers, 
continually exerted a right i s t influence within the Kuomintang; but 
in t ypical reactionary fashion, they always denied they Here reaction-
ary. See 11 C-C Clique Denies Rightist Tag, 11 New~~, August 
15, 1946, Sec. 7, 4. 
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principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in practice, were writing that 
the policies of the Chinese Communist Party had grown less and 
less radical since the achievement of the United Front against 
Japan in 193 7, and were quoting Mao as saying that local elections 
were the key to r eturning the government of China t o popular 
sovereignty.6 
Central to the solution of the Chinese civil conflict 
and to the inauguration of stable government was the plan for 
reduction and integration of the respective armies into an anny 
which would be nonpolitical in character and which would maintain 
order and thus clear the air for polit ical negotiations. Ideally, ,. 
this was calculated t o make the coalition efficacious in spite of 
the extreme ideological differences between the two principle f ac-
tions. Here again, ostensibly, it was the Communists who sabotaged 
t he plan, refusing to hand in a list of their units on March 26, and 
subsequently pressing for revision of the ratios, particularly with 
regaro to }ia.nohuria.. Still, the Communists insisted that their 
actions were in riposte t o the Nationalists• i gnoring of truce teams; 
an:l so t he question must remain as to whether within the chain of 
command of an anny, it is possible to ignore politics completely. 
I t seems rather fatuous at this point, in view of the decidedly and 
6Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Cormnunism a..'1d the Hise of Mao 
1,,Camb ridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 8J. 11 Sun Yat-sen'T°s 
t heo!'"'J of tutelage, reinforced a s it had been by Borodin's recognition 
of the Kuomintang, had made that party quite immune to notions of pol-
itical democracy or of the multiparty system. The fact that power with-
in this party had gravitated into the hands of military men •• • simp-
ly reinf creed its undemocratic nature. 11 
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inherently political nature of the armies involved, to believe 
that a national gendarmarie could have been insti tuted into which 
no political interests intruded themselves .? This is particularly 
tru.e when it seemed to have been the assumption of American Far 
Eastern policymakers that a national government 1/nich legalized 
political parties only insofar as they recognized the national 
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was as close to 11 nonpolitica.l1' as 
it was possible to get . 
The predication of American policy upon ideological consid-
erations, however, clearly ignored diplomatic realities. As the 
Chamber of Connnerce report of Harch 16, 19h9, finally revealed, 
Chiang had been a bad risk. 5 Argument on this point had raged inter-
minably ever since Henry A. Wallace had returned from his mission 
to report to Presi dent Roosevelt: 
Chiang, a r.1an with an Oriental militar--y- mind, sees his auth-
ority threatened by economic deterioration, which he; does 
not understand, and by social unrest symoolized in Communism, 
which he thoroughly distrusts, and neither of which he can 
control by military commands ••• Chiang, at best, is a shorG-
term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelli-
gence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders 
of postwar China will be brought f orwaro by evol ution or rev-
olution, and it now seems more likely the latter.9 
Wallace's p~ediction caine all too true; and, accoroi.ng to Werner Levi,. 
the Nationalists, after having been run off the mainland by the 
successful revolution, tradm:itted frankly that their inefficiency, 
bsee p. 97 of t his paper. 
9As quoted in Henry Wei, China and Soviet Tol.ssia (Princeton: 
D. Van Nostrand Company, 19.56), '7:58"=7'0;'" 
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corruption, and neglect of the people•s welfare contributed to the 
disaster on the mainland.1110 
On the other hand, by the tir1e Marshall was assigned to 
_China, it had become clear that the United States could not risk 
offering any kind of pennanent support to t he Chinese Conmnmists. 
Even the minds of most of the Foreign Service officers, who early 
had extolled the methods and aspirations of Yenan, had since been 
changed. John Paton Davies, for instance, had written on June 24, 
1943: 
Foreign observors , including liJnericans, who have recently 
visited the Communist area agree that the Comm.uni.st regime 
in present policy is far removed from orthodox CoirJ11U11ism; 
that it is administrati vely remarkably honest; that popular 
elections are held; that ii.-idbridual freedom is relatively 
uncurbed; that the regime appears to have strong popular 
support and that it is described less accurately as Comm-
unist than as agrarian democratic.11 
By late 1945, however, Davies was agreeing that the Chinese Commu-
nists were quite orthodox Mar::dst-Leninists who had accepted the 
"inevitability of gradualness. 1112 Thus, by the time policy had been 
formulated during the Truina.n administration, it had resorted to some 
rather tricky rruances: the E:uomintang was so corrupt and reactionary 
that further substantia1 economic aid, i t was concluded, nmst await 
its refonn. Yet, the Kuomintang was supposed to reform and simultan-
eously exert 11democratic 11 leadership over the Cormmmists, who really 
lOwerner Levi, 11 Fonnosa and 1The China Issue, : 11 Current History, 
XLI \ December, 1961), 322. 
llu .After Nineteen Years : New Light on 1fily China was Lost, 11 U. S. 
News and forld Report (April 2, 1962), 54-86. ----
12Kenneth s. Lato,.;:rette, The American Record JE ~, 1945-
1951 (New York: The l4a.cmillan-C0mpany, 1~52), 219. 
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were Communists, in the estima:1:,ion of the administration, bent 
on the ultimate destruction of bourgeois forms of gove:rnrnent. 
11 What I hoped to see, 11 wrote Truraan in succinct sumrnary, 11 was 
China made into a country in which Communism would lose its appeal 
to the masses because the needs of the p eople and the voice of the 
people would have been answered. 1113 Thus, the most prominent ancillary 
essay of the Marshall }Iission was to ask Comr:ru.nists to join in an 
effort to defeat Communism. 
:varshaJ.l, accordingly, was sent into China to follow a rather 
rigid but pragmatically tenuous line which included e1cternal democrat-
ization, the formation of a nonpolit ical army, and, most primarily, 
the backing of China•s presumably best asset for democracy, Chiang 
Kai-shek . Harsh.all had no authority for any kind of deflection from 
this path, and, being the kind of diplomat he was, molded by military 
training into austere obedience and singleminded ratiocination, by 
personal character into a certain timorousness and capacity for p ause, 
he followed the path set down by the administra tion to the ver-J 
letter. Dynamic personal diplomacy of the type which seems to have 
been needed to contravene the two uinevitabilities11 which Marshall 
had to deal with 1'ras not the promise . Some leeway, it seems, for a. 
machiavelianism to deal ,;-ti.th foes who were not exactly antimachiavels 
themselves, should have been a llowed. Assuredly, there should have 
been momentary shifts from left to right, as besuited the given sit-
l3Han--y s. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 
1955) , II, 91. Hereinafter cited as Tru.-nan, Memoirs. 
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uation. As it was, however, Marshall, as we have noted, found 
himself. finally paralyzed and alr~ost completely at the mercy of 
a Kuomintang -which i gnored him, and then ndespitefully used" hiJn.14 
Certainly, in dealing with two such inveterately opposed 
factions, one must play both ends against the middle . In the face 
of the 11 real11 abstractions of social belief posited by Hegel, Fichte, 
and Spengler, this is the only tack for the democratic, event-ma.king 
man of action. 
Secondly, the movements of American troops then in China 
should have reinforced these momentary feints to right and left. 
Balkiness and intransigence from either side should have been met 
w:i.. th a strategic deployment of t r oops consistent w""i th the diplomatic 
maneuvers. The State and •·Jar Departments, at t he time of the 
beginning of the ·Harshall Hission, had instructed General Wedemeyer 
that: 
Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North 
China ports may be immediately perfected, but not communicated 
to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed 
when General Marshall determines either la) that the movement 
of Chinese troops into North China can be carried out consis-
tently with his negotiations, or \b) that t he negotiations 
between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of 
success and t hat the circumstances are such as to make the 
movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to 
secure the long-term interests of the United states and the 
maintenance of international peace.15 
Security of the long-term interests of the United States, it seems, 
14see pp. 75 ff. of this paper. 
15Truman, Memoirs , II, 72. 
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would have dictated this leeway for using troops only as they 
benefited the negotiations. As it was, the marines were admit-
ting as early as August of 1946 that they were being used in the 
-aid of one faction in China--the Chinese Nationalists.16Truman 
had early demolished the thought of full-scale military occupat-
ion on two gro,mds: 1) the popular demand for demobilization and 
return of .American troops home, and 2) the tremendous effort, ex-
penditure, and risk of life that it would have taken to occupy a 
large country like China. But what Western policy from 1560 to 
1941, and Soviet policy from 1941 to 1949, proved, was that relative-
ly small eJg?enditures in men, equipment, and aid are enough to 'Wield 
a balance of power when a near stalemate in full-scale conflict is 
in eff ect, as it was in China in 1946. It would not have required 
full military occupation to have worked our 1,dll in China at this 
time; but it certainly did r equire more than an entirely passive 
attempt at mediation. 
]• Panaceas 2::: retrospect: eJmmination 2£ post-mortems. 
From the early debate over China policy which Herbert Feis 
records as raging between General Patrick Hurlel7and the Foreign 
Service officers, the former vesting confidence in Chiang Ka.i-shek 
16As see "Marines Admit Aid One Faction, 11 York ~, 
August 20, 1946, Sec. 2, 2. 
17rn spite of bis early belief that the Chinese Communists were 
not really Communists, fu.rley soon changed his mind in 1945. Don 
Lobbeck, Patrick .!!_. Hurley \Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 1956), 250. 
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and the latter recommending everything from "rapid and thorough11 
reform of the Kuomintang to all-out support of the Communists, 
the lines of thinki.ng have largely developed into the hard.nosed 
-anti-Communist line and the 11liberal, 11 or II soft-on-Comrm.m:i.sm11 
line. 
'Ihe Hurley school develops historically into the contention 
that we should have rendered unmitigated and unqualified support to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Latourette•s conclusion that China 
was not ready f or the ld.nd of danocracy which Americans know destroys 
to the satisfaction of this line of thought the Foreign Service 
officers 1 recommendation for rapid refonn. of the Kuomintang. These 
critics claim it would have done no good; Kuomintang suppression 1-m.s 
necessary because of the historical tradition of China and because it 
opposed a worse suppression in the form of Communism. As Senator 
McCarthy asserted, we should have rendered full mill tary aid to Chiang, 
forcibly inducted Communist troops into the Kuomintang armies, and, 
in particular, should have encouraged and backed the att,ack on Y,a.1-
gan. Materialization of this v.i.ctory could have, according to rfoCarthy•s 
estimates of Nationalist strength at the time, culminated in the 
unification of China under Kuomintang rule!8 It is Truman, however, 
who gives a particular argument against this: 
WJoseph R. McCarthy, The. ~ _of General Ge1rfe Marshall (Madison: Friends of Senator McearthyCo:mmittee, 9 /J), i89. 
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In 1945 and 1946, of all years, thoughts of full-scale 
military operations in China would have been rejected ey 
the American people before they were even e.xpressed. That 
was the time when congressmen in Washington joined in the 
call to •get t he boys back home,• and our influence through-
out the world, as well as in China, waned as the millions 
of American soldiers were processed through the discharge 
cen-~ers.19 
The opposing recommendation, that which John Carter Vincent 
had posed in 1942 of going all the i-ro.y to the left, ,,.as completely 
discredited when it became apparent in 1945 that 11 Russia might 
decide to support the Yenan regime in a postwar struggle for pol-
itical power within China. 1120 Still, tactical sorties to the left 
might have been allowed for by the clouded prospects which both 
Moscow and Yenan had in 1945. As Stephen D. Kertiesz writes: 
"Stalin had little confidence in the Chinese Communist Party and 
its leadership in the 1930s, and thought no more highly of them in 
1945 at the time of the pos Yalta treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. 11 21 
'lhl.n.rcy, those imo pick at the personal diplomacy of Marshall 
as faulty or inef.'.ficient are largely mistaken. Har shall fallowed bis 
directives well, and with great competence. As we have noted, he 
flew three thousand miles to put into effect the initial truce, and 
19 Trurnan, Memoirs, II, 91. 
20Foster Rhea Dulles,~~ America, ~~~ their nel-
ations ,Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946) ,-""zsl. 
21stephen D. Kertiesz, "The U. s. s. R. and the Comnru.nist Bloc, 11 
Current History, m ,November, 1961), 281. 
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flew to Conmrunist headquarters at least t -rtlce to make overtures 
to the Connnunist leaders to come to the negotiating table. He 
kept the President fully informed of aJ.l his actions, and never 
· consciously aided one side or the other--and in :ract even seemed 
to work in naive innocence of the fact that his directives leaned 
slightly in the direction of one .faction. It 1-m.s along the line 
of intended impartiality that Narshall made his one error, 1-lbich 
in v.i.ew of the circunstances, -was a humanly understandable one., 
In the dark days of June, when Harshall was finding the 11neutrain 
policy singularly frustrating and, moreover, was being lambasted by 
the Communists for that ver-:1 policy, he turned on Chou in outraged 
self-defense and accused him of blocld.ng t he truce. 22 Certainly 
Marshall had been unfairly attacked. His ovm personal behavior 
in China is a legend in impartiality. Perhaps it shouldn't have 
been, however, for the only fault with the personal diplomacy of the 
Marshall Mission was that it wasn1 t eventful, inventive, or bold, 
and, most of all, that it wasn 1 t epic-making. 
}'farshall, indeed, had been picked for that very reason--for 
a promise of conformity which was then coming into vogue in Washington 
and "t-lh.ich found its base in a temper of anti-Communism that was nearly 
as absolute as the pernicious movement which it opposed. 
22see P• 00 of this paper. 
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As Archibald MacLeish writes: 
• • • in the four years from 1946 through 1949 American 
foreign policy was a mirror image of Russian foreign 
policy: wba tever t he Thl.ssians did, we did in reverse. 
American domestic politics were conducted under a kind of 
upside-down Russian veto: no man could be elected to pub-
lic office unless he was on record as detesting the Russ-
ians, and no proposal could be enacted, from a peace plan 
at one end to a. military budget on the other, unless it 
could be demonstrated that the Russians wouldn't like it. 
American poll tical controversy was controversy sung to 
the Russian tune.23 
Henry A. Wallace, moreover, who was Secretary of Commerce at the 
time Truman acceded to the Presidency, notes that after the depar-
ture of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson from the Cabinet, it 
"became more and more heavily loaded on the side of the Russia-
haters,11 and that "many big businessmen uho had co-operated with 
the Amry and Navy during the war were looking ahead to the probab-
ility, if not the inevitability, of war with Russia. 11 24 It was indeed 
this attitude which created certain inevitabilities. It was out 
of this singleminded abhorrence for Communism and a resolute intent-
ion to avoid it at every pass which resulted in a refusal to toy 
with Connnunism even in an effort to defeat it--a ruse w1,..ich would have 
been particularly appropriate to the China situation in 1946, and 
completely in accoro with the tenets of parliamentary democracy. 
Instead, we attempted to demand that Chinese Cormmmi.$ll enter into 
23Archibald. MacLeish, 11 '1he Conquest of America, 11 Atlantic Nonth-
!l \August, 1949), 17. Hereinafter cited as MacLeish, "conques't:-n--
2½-renry A. Wallace, Toward World Peace (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and Company, 1948), 8-16.- -
if 
lll 
a movement which would mean its final el:i.mina. ti.on. They refused, 
and "'!e, in a sense, joined them. As MacLeish ·writes: 
We had persuaded ourselves that this labor of resistance 
and containment nmst take precedence over everything else, 
and that purely American objectives and purposes, includ-
ing the great traditional objectives of American life, 
nm.st not only be subordirated to the accomplishment of 
the task of contai..,ment, but even, in certain cases, sac-
rificed to it .. 25 
Certainly in China, in 1946, democracy suffered a tremendous sac-
rifice in the wide abyss which yawned between a Communism and an 
anti-Communist driye 1mich had agreed to become poles apart, and to 
vanquish almost everything in between. Certain provisions within 
the creed of democratic nationalism were for the time being adumbrated 
by a temper which seemed to sweep the world and which centered its 
focus on ideology. The United States required that economic and 
political development be uphe d until the military settlement became 
perfect. Their foes made economic and political settlements within 
their own bailiwicks while looking to a violent protraction of the 
military struggle. 
25:r,ra.cLeish, 11 Conquest, 11 22. 
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